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ABSTRACT 
With the extant work on civil war duration as a starting point, this project uses the Ugandan case 
to identify and address theoretical aporias in our existing understanding of the determinants of 
duration. The vast majority of existing work begins with the assumption that the rebel force is 
the determining factor in the duration of conflict. Challenging this assumption, I argue that civil 
war duration should be understood as a function of the calculations made by both the rebel units 
and the established state, a dynamic that has implications for the way in which we think of the 
preferences of the state. Finally, that incentive structures exist, given the nature of post-colonial 
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peace as a collective good to the broader population as civil war can be used as one of Jeffrey 
Herbst’s buffer mechanisms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This project begins with the question of why the civil war in Uganda has lasted so long 
and, more broadly, constructs a theory of civil war duration that focuses on the preferences of the 
state rather than the capacity or motivations of the active rebel movement.  The existing literature 
on civil war duration provides a number of possible explanations for why civil conflict 
continues, but the conflict in Northern Uganda has escaped the explanations provided by the 
dominant camps in the civil war duration literature.  Rather than following the prescriptions and 
coming to an end, the conflict continues.  To address this puzzle, I suggest that in semi-
democratic or transitional countries, a low intensity conflict in the boundary areas coupled with 
the injection of consistent international assistance allows the ruling elites of the country to 
manipulate two basic elements of domestic politics to assure their re-election or continued access 
to political power.  Scrutinizing these elements, the relationships between state and society and 
between the state and the military, is crucial to understanding the length of both civil war and 
political tenure.  
From this, I build a theory of preference ordering that synthesizes literature on domestic 
constituency management and security sector operation in semi-democratic states that suggests 
that the interaction of international funding and a low level peripheral insurgency can insulate 
politicians from the requirements of the national constituency, instead allowing politicians to 
focus on providing resources and services for those key constituencies that continue to pose a 
threat to individual politician’s political tenure while not expending the resources necessary to 
end the conflict whose cost in borne by the marginalized minority.    After outlining my theory, I 
apply it to the case of the Northern Ugandan civil war that has continued since 1986 despite the 
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strengthening of the state both militarily through bilateral military assistance and economically 
given the growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).     
The conflict in Northern Uganda has continued since the ousting of Milton Obote in 1986 by 
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army. This makes it the longest running conflict on the 
continent. What explains the persistence of this conflict?  The current literature on civil war duration 
produces a number of clear theoretical hypotheses as to the factors that contribute to the termination 
of conflict. Using the available work as a starting point, this project begins with an assessment of the 
literature and then uses the Ugandan case to identify and address theoretical aporias in our existing 
understanding of the determinants of duration. Though they are distinct sub fields in the civil war 
discourse, civil war duration and termination are inextricably linked; a decrease or elimination of 
factors that feed extended conflict can lead to its speedy termination, as was the case in Angola when 
the external backers of both the rebels and the government withdrew support. The fundamental 
question must be: what goes into the calculations rebels and governments use when deciding to end 
or continue a civil war? Finally, I propose that a perverse incentive structure, created by international 
and domestic variables, makes a low-level conflict in the north politically useful without threatening 
the central government.  This incentive structure then opens conflict as a tool for political elites 
with which they can manage their political constituencies.  I expand the existing theory proposed 
by Jeffrey Herbst on ―buffer mechanisms‖ to include low-level peripheral conflict as, like 
citizenship policies and fixed national boundaries, conflict limits the ability of the opposition to 
organize or fully participate in politics while simultaneously limiting the demands of external 
actors.  I examine the tools used by political elites to maintain the current political system and at the 
same time project an appearance of commitment to ending the conflict and strengthening democratic 
practice.  
  
3 
To conclude, I discuss the broader implications of this theory.  The crux of my argument is 
that there are static power relationships within Uganda that are fundamentally changed by the 
ongoing conflict in the North and the influx of international assistance.  These power dynamics exist 
in all countries but specifically in those countries where the constitutional limitations on power are 
weakly instituted, rational actors can be expected to use conflict to consolidate their position in the 
system rather than view war as a breakdown in politics as a whole. 
A cursory survey of the current media coverage and academic work on the civil war in 
Northern Uganda reveals a singular focus on the rebel army, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and 
the sensationalized recruitment of children into the LRA. The rebels are painted as monsters that 
arbitrarily kill and maim with no political motivations; in effect, the depravity of the rebel unit 
perpetuates the conflict. This coverage of the group’s grim potency, however, is juxtaposed against 
other pictures and reports of the LRA as a threadbare group that can barely keep its troops in shoes 
and clothing. There appear to be two LRAs: the one of legend and the one of reality. I contend that 
unpacking  this apparent incongruity is essential to comprehending the civil war in Uganda, as the 
admittedly dangerous LRA,  often the only focus of world media attention, is also a tool used by 
political power elites to achieve three goals: limit the participation of oppositional political groups, 
maintain the support of the military while limiting the threat of coup or mutiny, and provide political 
cover for the limited investment in infrastructure and inclusion of northern ethnic groups in 
government positions. Teasing out why the conflict in Uganda has lasted so long in spite of what we 
know about the determinants of civil war duration from the literature on African politics and state 
development, and the development trajectory of Uganda, will allow me to build a more robust theory 
of civil war duration.  
       I identify the most salient motivations for the protracted low intensity conflict in Uganda 
by examining both current civil war literature and previous literature on the determinants of war 
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in Uganda. I conclude that the incentive structure is present for the government to maintain the 
conflict in the Northern, Acholi dominated, parts of the country as a way of consolidating 
political power and maintaining international interest and aid.  To provide a foundation for my 
theory of political management, I present an analysis of the relationship between the Acholi 
people and the government in contrast with the LRA and the Acholi.  Ethnicity is often a tool 
used by power elites to manage the expectations of domestic groups to privilege the dominant or 
limit the expectations of excluded groups and mask the political and fiscal utility of limited 
conflict rather than the key factor in duration.  The practical limitation of the political 
participation of the population affected by the insurgency is a key determinant in why conflicts 
with peripheral insurgencies such as the one in Uganda are allowed to continue.  I then situate 
Uganda in the international system to show that because of its relative stability, even at the cost 
of democracy, international donors are willing to overlook the conflict because, superficially, 
Uganda appears to be an African success story in a region of the continent characterized by 
instability and full scale conflict.  This may seem counterintuitive given the stated international 
commitment to peace and democracy,
1
 but donor countries are under pressure domestically to 
show positive progress as a result of aid contributions in order to justify continued international 
involvement and, in the post 9/11 era, to find and maintain allies in the US’s war on terror in the 
developing world.  
                                                 
1 As evidenced by global and regional agreements such as OAU Charter (1963), African (Banjul) Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986), Charter of the United Nations (1945)  United Nations Fund for Democracy 
(2005) 
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EXISTING LITERATURE ON CIVIL WAR DURATION 
According to Thomas Kuhn, scientific paradigms are represented by competing camps of 
theorists and competing paradigms are a choice between ―fundamentally irreconcilable‖ schools 
of thought.  When theorists enter into a debate about fundamental questions, each group uses its 
own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense.  The result is a circularity and incapacity to 
share a universe of discourse (Kuhn; 1996). Woodward and Pickard call this inability to 
reconcile new or oppositional paradigms the tyranny of theory, which prevents forward 
movement in a discipline stymied by divergent but fundamental understandings of political 
phenomena (Woodward n.d.).   
The extant literature on conflict duration is no different and can be separated into three 
theoretical camps whose proponents privilege particular features of the socio-economic and 
political environment when explaining war termination: macroeconomic indicators, state 
capacity indicators, and commitment issues.  All three camps, while legitimate attempts at 
identifying the motivations of rebel forces, make a counter-intuitive theoretical assumption: that 
the weaker party in the conflict, the rebel force, is the determining factor in the duration of 
conflict. In most of the dominant theories of international relations, researchers concern 
themselves primarily with those parties who wield the greatest amount of power. The hypothesis 
that the stronger party in civil war, usually the state, is the determining factor in war is the 
starting point for the theory constructed in this paper. The state, rather than being an incidental 
and ultimately benign actor, is, therefore, assumed to have preferences and strategies that are 
constantly being modified to achieve the ultimate goal of politicians - the capture and 
maintenance of political power and access to state resources.  
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The accepted theories of civil war duration do not adequately explain the civil war in 
Uganda.  Uganda, however, is not fundamentally different from other civil wars in the sense that 
the factors behind the duration are different.  Rather, I suggest that there are key determinants of 
duration missing from existing models.  Many of the variables included in current models of 
duration are taken directly from the literature on civil war onset
2
 as they represent theoretically 
important facets of conflict.  This is a useful starting point for theoretical testing but when 
considering onset we are usually only assessing the calculations of rebel leaders.  Because onset 
is generally one- sided, the debate on rebel greed versus group grievances is theoretically 
reasonable.  In duration models, however, the calculations of both the rebel group and the 
government forces must be considered and variables addressing two sets of calculations must 
then be present.   
In this section, I present the leading perspectives from each theoretical camp as each 
introduces different predictions about what factors make war last and I assess their explanatory 
merit in this case.  Finally, I introduce the literature that focuses explicitly on the current war in 
Northern Uganda.  I argue that the Ugandan specific literature largely abandons the attempt to 
construct theories around the assumptions that actors will act in their rational self-interest as 
much of the current theory focuses on the mental capacity of the leadership or ethnic or religious 
motivations of the rebel groups.  Most importantly the broader conclusion to be gleaned from the 
Uganda literature is that the LRA is at most, half-heartedly motivated by political goals, which is 
troubling given the obvious challenges that poses both for understanding the conflict and, 
perhaps more importantly, how to bring it to an end.   
                                                 
2
 Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom’s 2004 article ―on the Duration of Civil War‖ explicitly tests the model of civil 
war onset in a Cox Proportional Hazard model to see if the same determinants of civil war onset were useful in the 
explanation of duration.  They found that the model did ―remarkably badly‖ when predicting duration and that the 
overall explanatory power of the model is 20%. 
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Economic Literature 
 
It is widely believed that cultural groups have a comparative advantage in maintaining 
collective action because they are less prone to free riding than groups formed on other social 
foundations and because the differences between combatants are static; elites can maintain 
participation of group members simply by continuing to emphasize ―chosen traumas‖3 to 
reactivate feelings of insecurity.  Theorists have suggested that in-group altruism, common 
knowledge, and readily available social networks strengthen the ability of elites to trigger these 
emotional responses and maintain collective action because common interest and in-group 
policing mechanisms are already in place and more direct and personal benefits or threats are not 
necessary to maintain compliance.  These conclusions on collective action and group 
participation are vital to understanding why people join rebel movements and what compels 
them to keep fighting.  In recent years, however, some scholars have suggested that economic 
incentives can act as a substitute for cultural similarities.   
Economic theories of onset and duration are based on the argument that while collective 
action problems are possible to overcome, ethnicity or shared grievances are insufficient 
determinants of continued participation.  To sustain a rebellion, elites will necessarily turn to 
selective economic benefits for participants.  Hirschleifer proposes a Machiavellian theorem that 
states that no person will ever give up an opportunity to gain an advantage even if this requires 
exploiting another party (Korf; 2007).  Additionally, Grossman in his essay ―Kleptocracy and 
Revolution‖ somewhat cynically concludes "the romantic notions of idealists notwithstanding, 
the characterization of revolutions as manifestations of kleptocratic rivalry seems historically 
accurate‖ (Grossman; 1999).  These theorists assume a Hobbesian theory of human nature and, 
                                                 
3
 Kinnvall defines chosen traumas as group histories that carry intense emotional resonance that often the basis of 
the intractability of ethnic conflict. 
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while they recognize the role of collective problems in civil war, they maintain that the 
mobilization of grievances is useful only in the sense that it provides popular legitimacy for 
combatants’ behavior and allows them to prolong conflict as long as the economic benefits 
remain available.  Economic reward for participants is necessary to sustain civil war. 
Building a model on the theory of rebellion as a business, in  Greed and Grievance in 
Civil War (2000) Collier and Hoeffler conclude that political and social variables that are most 
obviously related to grievances (ethnic and religious divisions, political repression and 
inequality)  have little explanatory power when talking about civil war onset.  By contrast, 
economic variables, which could proxy some grievances but are perhaps more obviously related 
to the viability of rebellion, provide considerably more explanatory power. 
Also rejecting the model of grievance mobilization, Mats Berdal and David Keen identify 
seven economic activities of rebel and state forces that may prevent the end of civil war and 
suggests that victory may not be the only goal of rebel units (Berdal and Keen; 1997).  Collier 
(2000) compares rebellion to household theft, where natural resources substitute for personal 
wealth.  Such rebellion is a variety of crime, but with distinctive differences.  Because of the 
differential degrees of geographic concentration of household and natural resources,  and hence 
differences in the difficulty of defense, the geographic choke points concentrate the activity of 
predation in a relatively few locations.  A corollary of this concentration is that natural resource 
extraction is relatively easy to defend once acquired.  He interprets these finding to support his 
―rebellion-as-business‖ in which the critical incentive is delivered during the war rather than 
after as in models where victory is the key goal 
The rebel greed hypothesis presented above is popular in policy circles and much of the 
conventional wisdom on civil war references the theories of these scholars.  A resurgence of 
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skepticism among civil war scholars in recent years, however, has led to challenges to the 
validity of the greed hypotheses, with suggestions that the solely economic incentives of war are 
an over simplification of a complex phenomenon (Ross; 2004, Fearon; 2004, Snyder and 
Bhavnani; 2005 Sambanis; 2004).  In addition, the greed versus grievance model explicitly 
examines the motivations of the rebel group, and assumes that the government has a vested 
interest in the termination of the conflict, or at least, that it prefers peace to conflict.  Collier 
concludes that rebel units will have to be sufficiently large to protect themselves against the 
government forces and adequately financed for the same reason.  This conclusion implies that 
the size and strength of a successful rebel unit is, in fact, a function of capacity of the state.  Put 
simply, if the size and strength of the state increases over time, the rebel force will necessarily 
require more resources and participants if the conflict is going to continue.  Such is not 
necessarily a proportional increase as, unlike the state, they have tools of war such as extreme 
violence and kidnapping, that can be used to magnify the perceived strength of the unit.  In states 
like Uganda where international assistance and an increase in state strength is evident over the 
course of the conflict, the hypothesis that rebel greed motivates the duration of war seems 
inadequate and yet retains its dominance  in the discourse on civil war.   
The literature was originally so persuasive because it drastically reinterpreted our 
understanding of what drives civil war.  Prior to the development of the greed theory of war, the 
mobilization of pre-existing social linkages like ethnicity, religion, or language groups overcame 
collective action costs.  Because our understanding of war was linked to permanent socio-
political characteristics, war was not a rational decision and, therefore, difficult to address from a 
policy standpoint.  Ethnic hatreds were seen as primordial conflicts rather than distributional 
issues.  Since the publication of ―On Economic Causes of Civil War‖ in 1998, however, many in 
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the discipline have re-examined their original conclusions that pure greed motivates the desire to 
go to war.  Instead, they suggested that the effect of primary commodities is overstated by the 
existence of a few extreme cases and that Collier and Hoeffler’s interpretation of primary 
commodity significance was flawed ((Ross; 2004, Fearon; 2004, Lujala, Gleditsch, and 
Gilmore;(2005). 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom examine war duration explicitly, as they assert that 
peace and civil war are persistent states and so we cannot assume that the same factors that 
contribute to the initiation of civil conflict also make it probable for the conflict to persist.  They 
find that the share of primary commodity exports is not significant in explaining duration, but 
where average income is low or inequality is high, wars persist.  This is consistent with our 
understanding of individual motivations to participate in conflict; where the perceived 
opportunity costs are low and selective benefits are available to participants, followers are more 
likely to be willing to continue fighting.   
Michael Ross (2004) advocates the disaggregation of the measure of primary commodity 
resources because the division of resources into specific groups (legal versus non-legal or 
agricultural versus mineral) affords researchers a more nuanced understanding of the role of 
primary commodities in the onset and termination of conflict.  Finally, Ross asks the question: 
which way does the causal arrow go?  He is skeptical of the overall use of resource driven 
models because of the absence of a clear causal mechanism (Ross; 2004).  The example of 
Angola illustrates that manufacturing and service industry jobs flee from the threat of conflict, 
thereby changing the dynamics of the domestic market and allowing scholars like Collier and 
Hoeffler to overestimate the effect of prior economic conditions.  James Fearon (2004), 
alternatively, asserts that the significance of primary commodities in the model is driven by the 
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inclusion of oil.  According to Fearon, rather than a matter of rapacity, a greater dependence on 
oil and commodities is the trademark of a rentier and, by definition, weak state.  Primary 
commodities thus become a proxy for state capacity rather than an economic motivator or the 
successful appropriation of lootable resources.  As Fearon defines the importance of primary 
commodities, he shows that conflicts over lootable resources are the longest lasting wars.  This 
can be explained as both a failure of the state to respond adequately to the rebellion and also as a 
consistent resource that can be exploited by rebel leaders to prevent defection.  Further, Walter 
suggests that rather than a matter of lootable resources, onset and duration are tied primarily to 
the standard of living prior to the conflict.  She concludes that when opportunity costs for joining 
and continuing a conflict remain low, we can expect an enduring conflict.   
State Capacity Literature  
 
The second theoretical path in the literature is the scholarship that proposes state 
capacity
4
 is the key factor in understanding civil war duration.  These scholars imply that the 
solution to curtailing civil war duration is to improve the capacity of the state, but as some like 
Jeff Herbst note, it may be a matter of too few resources too late.  Herbst (2004) examined the 
escalation of insurgencies in Africa and found two stages.  In the initial stage of the conflict, 
                                                 
4
 Most notably Weber defines military capacity as the state’s ability to deter or repel challenges to its authority with 
force (Weber; 1919). Cullen Hendrix divides the methods of defining state capacity or the ability to repress/ defeat 
threats to state dominance into three categories: military capacity, bureaucratic administrative capacity, and the 
quality and coherence of political institutions (Hendrix; 2010). Military capacity address the ability of the state to 
put boots and supplies into the field while bureaucratic and administrative efficiency refers to the ability of the state  
to collect and process information .  Lastly the quality and coherence of institutions refers to the degree to which 
democratic and non-democratic features are intermingled in the political system.  The coherence of political 
institutions is most frequently measured by the Polity2 Score which measures the degree to which a state is 
authoritarian or democratic.  Bureaucratic efficiency is represented by Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) by 
the PRSG’s ―risk of expropriation and repudiation of government contracts‖ measure while Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) alternatively use primary commodity exports as a share of GDP as a proxy as they contend that rentier states 
fundamentally fail to develop effective state structures because they derive their resources from export taxes rather 
than individual taxes.  Finally military capacity is defined as both military personal per capita and military spending 
as a percentage of GDP which captures the increase in resource mobilization and ability of the state to address 
armed threats to its own dominance.  In this study I will incorporate all measures into my assessment and 
construction of my theory as all three measures enrich our understanding of the power and reach of the formal state.    
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insurgencies are small and easy to put down with minimal, but effective, state intervention; as 
time passes, however, and insurgencies gain strength, states will require a higher degree of state 
mobilization.  He notes that because poor state organization and insufficient institutions so 
hinder the ability to respond quickly in states with limited resources, the chances of being able to 
address the insurgency erode considerably after the beginning of the conflict.  Herbst’s central 
theory (2004) is that when the state capacity is stretched, the state will become more unlikely to 
expend sufficient resource and/ or political capital to address the rebellion.  Buhaug et al (2009) 
mirror this concern, but proxy challenges to state capacity by coding the ―absolute‖ and 
―relative‖ distances to the conflict from the epicenter of government.  The absolute distance 
measures the actual distance the military must project power in order to engage rebel forces and 
the relative distance measures the geographic impediments to the projection of power such as 
forests, rough terrain, and whether or not the conflict is in a non-contiguous territory.  The 
authors find these indicators are significant in conflict duration. Their conclusions on the impact 
of terrain are mirrored in the findings of Collier and Hoeffler in their most recent study on civil 
war duration. (2001)  As the distance between the stronghold of government and the conflict 
widens, states must invest greater resources; as their military capacity is diminished, their ability 
to strike decisively is limited.  Fearon (2004) proposes a similar typology that differentiates 
―peripheral insurgencies‖ from all others and acknowledges that these distant conflicts pose less 
of a challenge to state function and are more difficult to address and are therefore longer than 
popular revolutions or anti-colonial wars that have the strictly stated goals of capturing the power 
of the central government.  Finally, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) use bureaucratic efficiency and 
military size as their indicators of state capacity.  Their argument is that an effective bureaucracy 
will reduce the chances of a rebel victory as the state can then more efficiently address rebel 
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groups.  Counter-intuitively, they conclude that an effective bureaucracy does not increase a 
government’s chances of victory.  DeRouen and Sobek attribute this to regime type; democracies 
are less willing to strike decisive blows to a smaller opponent than are their authoritarian 
counterparts.  In addition, they conclude that a stronger military only marginally increases the 
state’s ability to achieve victory.  In short, prior theory has concluded that the more difficult it is 
to project effective state authority into a section of territory either because of geographic or 
(state) organizational impediments, the more difficult it is to end civil wars. 
State capacity literature is well suited to answer the question of why states cannot 
unilaterally end a conflict when their resources are limited, but is ill-fitted for  conflicts in which 
the state has not only grown in terms of capacity but also has an abundance of international 
resources from which to draw aid with limited pressure to end the conflict.  DeRouen and Sobek 
conclude that in conflicts in which the United Nations intervenes, there is a higher likelihood of a 
negotiated settlement but they suggest that the United Nations only intervenes in conflicts that 
are severely protracted or particularly violent.  In their model, UN intervention represents 
international pressure to end conflicts even at the disadvantage of both rebels and the 
government of  Uganda, where there is a steady growth rate and consistent international interest 
in development and military aid, seems to contradict all of the relevant findings on state capacity.   
Commitment Issue Literature 
 
The perspective of the third theoretical camp, which privileges the commitment issues 
that arise out of fear, a lack of trust between parties, and the competing political goals of the 
parties, is useful in explaining why rebels remain committed to the conflict rather than to peace 
initiatives and is, therefore, important for my argument.  As in most questions in conflict studies, 
however, while there are many variables that contribute to any outcome,  as scientists, our task is 
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to find the root determinants of duration and so I suggest a reinterpretation of the goals of both 
the government and rebel forces. 
The causes of commitment issues named in the literature are diverse and address the 
problems in ending conflict faced by rebel leadership even once they have reached a ―hurting 
stalemate‖. (Zartman; 2001)  Generally, in the literature, a highly fractionalized society has not 
been found to be significantly correlated with civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin; 2004: Collier; 
2001).  Not so with duration.  Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom conclude that societies that score a 
50 on the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF)
5
 are likely to experience substantially 
longer wars.  Their conclusion is supported by Doyle and Sambanis’ observation that ―wars with 
an ethnic or religious overtone are less likely to be resolved (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 786).   
Shanna Kirshner (2007), on the other hand, advocates the examination of the mechanisms 
linking ethnicity and conflict and she tests the implications of discriminatory policies and 
identification of the ―other‖ as well as the previous interaction of the two parties by including a 
measure for atrocities in a Cox hazard model of duration.  All of her primary variables- easily 
identifiable ethnically organized rebels, a history of conflict between the combatants, atrocities 
during the war, and segregation - are significant in the extension of civil war.  Her findings 
revitalize the discourse of identity in conflict and underscore the role of the international 
community as a credible negotiator.  Where inter-group trust is low, identity, and specifically 
historical identity conflict in society is key to understanding why people fight.   Adding support 
to Kirshner’s conclusion that ethnicity and identity do matter, Jose Montalvo (2010) postulates 
that the degree of ethnic heterogeneity at the outset of conflict is not a sufficient indicator for 
civil war duration because it fails to capture the degree of distrust between groups.  A diverse 
                                                 
5
 A 50 on the ELF index categorizes a society as what Collier calls a dominant society.  These states have one 
dominant majority group with a number of victimized minority groups.  
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population through which resources and rights are equitably distributed and with a standing 
tradition of acceptance will not erupt into civil war.  He theorizes that where tension over 
resource distribution or extreme marginalization exists, groups will be more willing to fight to 
win.  He concludes that countries with a high degree of ethnic polarization at the onset of conflict 
experience longer wars than those with a less polarized and more inclusive political environment 
despite the degree of fractionalization of the population.   
The role of international interveners in domestic conflict is ill defined since conflicting 
results exist in the literature.  Cunningham (2006) theorizes that the higher the number of veto 
players in a conflict including both domestic and international actors, the lower the chance of 
resolving the conflict because each player has a specific agenda and, when the agendas are 
diametrical, the pool of acceptable resolutions is greatly diminished.  When international backers 
become veto players in domestic conflicts, therefore, they may hurt rather than help.  Balch-
Lindsey and Enterline (2000), alternatively, find that military intervention on the part of third 
parties decreases the duration of the conflict by providing added support to the state to end the 
conflict.  Recent case studies would suggest that external interventions tend to exacerbate the 
conflict such as in Sudan, Angola, or the Democratic Republic of Congo; the literature offers 
contradictory conclusions when scholars consider cases like Bosnia in the early 1990s and 
Rwanda in 1994 where external intervention was instrumental in finding peace (Crocker et al; 
2005). 
This review of the literature carefully outlines the controversy in the scholarship but also 
highlights the primacy of the rebel faction as a decisive actor in conflict duration.  Economic 
determinants of duration suggest that rebels make calculations based on access to resources; 
identity theories suggest that rebel factions can most easily maintain mobilization along ethnic 
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lines, making ethnicity the theoretical center of the conflict.  The literature never articulates that 
the perpetuation of conflict could be politically useful for the existing state, so in cases like 
Uganda, where the central government has high capacity because it is underwritten by 
international non-profits and bilateral and multilateral aid, the continuance of conflict is baffling.   
The inability to explain the war in Uganda highlights a crucial gap in the literature. By 
focusing on the deliberations of the rebel group, we imply that conflict duration is solely a 
function of their understanding of the costs and benefits of continued insurrection.  By not 
examining the calculations of the state, we make simplifying  assumptions about the goals and 
preferences of the state being static across all cases that for many states may not be valid.  These 
assumptions stem from the canonical literature on social contracts and the role of the 
government.  John Locke asserted that when citizens enter into a social contract, they surrender 
some of their freedoms in exchange for security (Locke, 2003).  Locke’s concept of social 
contracts had obligations on the part of the citizen and the state that were mutually binding, and 
failure by either party had consequences.  Adam Smith defined the roles of government as the 
provision of public goods, justice, and security  (Smith, 1991).   
Uganda 
 
 The research that focuses exclusively on the war in Northern Uganda concludes that the 
war is motivated by issues centered on ethnicity, religion, or leadership (read Joseph Kony as 
insane).  I will outline the prominent literature on each explanation and conclude with an 
evaluation of the literature based on its utility in the case of Uganda and then in the broader 
context of civil war literature.  
 By far the most prevalent explanation of the conflict in Uganda is what Rosa Ehrenreich 
(1998) terms the ―insanity theory.‖  This explanation of why the war lasts is particularly popular 
  
17 
in the international media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the local population as 
part of what Svenker Finnstrom (2006) terms the ―official discourse‖; this has also become the 
underlying explanation for a significant portion of the research from the academic community as 
well.  The image of the LRA as an apolitical force embodied in Joseph Kony is derived from the 
LRA’s use of violence against its own people or source of domestic political support.  Robert 
Gersony contends in his article ―The Anguish of Northern Uganda‖ (1997), that the most brutal 
acts by the LRA are ―indiscriminate,‖ and, when carried out, ―the attacking forces demonstrate 
callous indifference and the unnecessary infliction of death in the course of operations which are 
of little military consequence.‖(44)  He concludes that the LRA’s use of violence has no guiding 
principles or desire to foster political support. Instead, it is driven by the bizarre leadership rather 
than legitimate political aims.  Supporting Gersony’s interpretation of the conflict, Doom and 
Vlassenroot (1999) argue that while the LRA may have initially formed with political goals, after 
the 1994 rejection by the Acholi leadership of the LRA as an agent of Acholi grievances, Kony 
became a ―mad Max‖ and the ―violence has become both a tool and an end in itself.‖   Gerard 
Prunier suggests the LRA has political motivation but that it is not internal to the organization.  
He argues that Kony is a ―mad man‖ but that the LRA serves the political goals of the Bashir 
government of Sudan rather than having an intrinsic set of goals (2004).  Prunier’s argument has 
been largely undermined (or at least mooted) by the 1999 agreement between the government of 
Sudan and the government of Uganda to stop funding each other’s oppositional insurgencies and 
to share intelligence to drive the LRA out of both Uganda and Sudan.    
The International Crisis Group dismisses any legitimate political motivations of the LRA 
based on the severity of civilian brutality even though they do acknowledge that official 
statements and speeches by the LRA often evoke Acholi nationalism, government discrimination 
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against the Acholi and the failure to protect the Northern residents against cattle losses after the 
war in the 1980s (ICG; 2004).   I do not intend to defend the actions or tactics of the LRA nor is 
my aim to ascribe political motivations that are only tangentially associated with the actions of 
the group to the leadership and followers; however, suggestions that the violence of the LRA is 
driven by madness strips the group of rationality as well as political motivations.   
The relationship between the LRA and the Northern population will be the focus in 
section six but here I point to the cases in which the LRA has used violence.  Symbolic acts of 
violence such as the disfigurement of civilians or the removal of limbs almost always targets 
those that are reported to be government collaborators or informants and are clearly intended to 
send a message to the Northern population (Dolan;2009).  Further attacks on villages and camps 
are usually reported as attempts to collect food or new ―recruits‖ to pad the LRA’s ranks to 
mitigate the enormous attrition rate.  At the outset of the conflict, the political motivations of the 
rebellion were much clearer cut, given the support of the Acholi community and Northern 
population more generally, but after the 1994 formal and public rejection of the LRA by Acholi 
religious and political leaders, violence appears to have become a tool of survival rather than the 
communication of political goals or a concerted effort at taking over the government (Finnstrom; 
2006).  In the case study, I more fully detail the position of the LRA in domestic politics in 
relation to the government and the inclusion of the International Criminal Court, making their 
use of violence, not necessarily political, but certainly rational.  
 A second theoretical track pursued in the existing literature is that the LRA is driven by 
a fanatical religious conviction that informs its actions.  Scholars are hard pressed to identify 
which theological tradition motivates the LRA because Joseph Kony has become a religious 
bricoleur, cobbling together all the religious traditions he encountered in order to play on the 
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fears and ignorance of his troops.  Bob Drogin asserts that the LRA is a ―… fanatic Christian 
fundamentalist cult led by a self-proclaimed prophet with a murderous manner‖ (1996).   Frank 
van Acker (2004) claims that the emergence and transformation of the LRA must be understood 
in relation to the fall of the preceding rebellion the Holy Spirit movement.  The current rebellion 
can be understood as a continuation of the goals of Alice Auma Lakwena who was the leader of 
the HSM dedicated to cleansing both the Acholi and the greater Uganda of the stains of war 
through the use of a mix of Christian and traditional beliefs.  He maintains that ―it would be a 
mistake to dismiss out of hand the force of the rebels’ beliefs,‖ and goes on to explain: 
―…the LRA sees its struggle against the government of Uganda as a divine cause that is 
being directed and guided by God through his prophet Kony, indicated by the 
importance of supporting rituals and the transcendent moralism justifying wholesale 
acts of violence (as opposed to the conventional principle of secular terrorism of using 
the minimum force necessary), and the ritual intensity with which these acts are 
committed.‖ (Van Acker; 2004) 
By using religious conviction as the motivating force behind the LRA’s actions, Van 
Acker explains that the motivations of the groups are not, in fact, meant to be political but 
primarily religious and social.  This theory addresses the goals of the group but artificially 
extends the convictions of the leadership to the bulk of the group which, given the attrition rate, 
is difficult to maintain.  If those in the LRA were uniformly faithful to the religious goals of the 
group, they would likely display the characteristics of other religiously motivated militia or 
terrorist groups, who demand complete devotion to the religious convictions of the group and 
historically have been more disciplined and programmatic in their actions than has been the 
LRA.  
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Finally, the role of ethnic tensions and the history of ethnic divisions in Uganda are 
prevalent in any discussion of the Ugandan conflict.  Sverker Finnstrom has cited the written 
manifestos and camp speeches made in the protected villages of the government where LRA 
leadership has demanded the political integration of the Acholi, reparations for lost cattle and an 
end to the ―genocide of the Acholi.‖ (Finnstrom; 2006)  Other scholars such as Kasozi and 
Okalany attribute the conflict to the continued failure of the government to direct resources for 
development to the North and the excessive centralization of political power of the multi-ethnic 
Uganda to the southern ethnic groups, with the most notable example being Yoweri Museveni 
himself (Kasozi; 1994).  They suggest that the LRA represents the grievances of the Acholi 
people and, therefore, the war will necessarily continue until the government pursues a more 
multi-ethnic principle and addresses the concerns of the Acholi people.   
A call for integration is echoed by Ali Mazrui’s analysis of the conflict.  Mazrui (1975) 
acknowledges the ethnic tensions in Uganda are indeed part of the broader political discourse but 
cites the failure to diversify the military as the single most destructive decision of the historical 
political leadership of Uganda leading to two significant consequences.  The first is that the 
military is a constant representation of the ethnic division in the country and the military 
presence in Acholiland is seen as a foreign occupation. The second consequence is the use of the 
military by political leaders to promote their own political and private goals by rallying support 
from their own ethnic group within the military.  This analysis of the situation in Uganda is 
correct in its presentation of the stark ethnic tensions in Uganda but misrepresents the role of the 
Acholi people as a uniquely marginalized people, the ethnic homogeneity of the rebel forces, 
and, finally, does not include the role of abduction in the continued rebel movement.  Scholars 
often reference the historical discrimination that began in the colonial period under the British 
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divide and rule strategy split Uganda into two sections, grouping the Acholi, Lango, 
Karamojong, and Iteso as peoples used for labor for the more productive south (Fredrick; 2009).  
This division has lasted into post-colonial politics but while the exclusion of the Acholi from 
government positions is part of the rhetoric of the rebel leadership, Achioli leadership has 
squarely rejected the LRA.  Accounts of Acholis leaving the camp to follow the rebels back to 
their camps with offerings of food and supplies are rare and do more to highlight the difficult 
position of the Acholi people who must decide whether to support a movement that conscripted 
their sons and daughters or reject the movement and thus reject their family members.  
Additionally, because of the high instance of forced participation, the LRA is not an ethnically 
homogenous rebellion nor are the recruits willing participants.  This is crucial in understanding 
the position of the rebels and the determinants of the war duration because while Kony himself is 
Acholi, his movement has been openly rejected by the traditional leadership of the Acholi as well 
as by the average Acholi as demonstrated by the low levels of willing participation.  Evidence 
from Uganda suggests that, although ethnic conflict was indeed an indicator of civil war onset, it 
is not sufficient as the planation of what makes this war durable. By surveying both case specific 
and more general literature on civil war, I clearly indicate the gaps in the existing literature 
caused by a pre-formulated interpretation of the events in Uganda and assert that the incentive 
structure constructed by international aid conditions, weak democratic institutions, and tangential 
links between the state and citizen lead politicians to allow conflict to continue to maintain 
political power and limit threats to regime change.  
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LIMITS OF THE EXISITNG LITERATURE   
 The existing literature on the democratic state makes a number of assumptions about the 
relationship between citizen and state that are challenged by modern polity.  International 
assistance and conflict fundamentally change the preferences of the state to deemphasize the 
importance of collective security.  This section will challenge unexamined assumptions and 
discuss their implications for civil war duration.  Historically, colonial rule created a culture of 
neglect in which states could afford to be unresponsive to their citizenry.  Modern aid regimes 
have reconstructed this system by breaking the links of accountability between state survival and 
the willing participation of the population.  Because the longevity of the regime is not 
determined exclusively by the fulfillment of the needs of the domestic constituencies, I argue 
that even in democracies, in the hierarchy of preferences, peace and security may not always be 
the primary goal of the state in light of the goals and preferences of individual politicians as 
rational actors.  Further, because the state can reasonably expect to survive small scale civil 
conflict with the help of international assistance, we should not assume that a threat to a portion 
of a state’s population constitutes a threat to the state.  
I conclude with an overview of  the ways in which low level conflict in an aid-rich 
environment can actually be politically useful for insulating elected officials from the demands 
of the population.  The division of  the population into  pro-government and oppositional  groups  
allows the government to limit the provision of public services to those who do not pose a threat 
to political tenure.  This confluence of conflict and assistance creates a space for the allocation of 
resources to the military and helps secure easier terms in aid negotiation for states facing such 
conflict.  Essentially an aid- rich environment and civil conflict create an ―amount‖ of conflict 
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that is acceptable and even politically useful, thus impeding the active and committed search for 
peace. 
  There are two fundamental theoretical assumptions that condition our understanding of 
governance and democracy in the world.  The first is the assumption that politicians are rational 
self-interested actors that will engage only in those actions that will prolong their political tenure 
(Buchanan and Tullock; 1979).  The second is that representative governments are founded upon 
a social contract between society and state where all people are created equal and willingly 
surrender their ability to enforce the natural law as individuals in exchange for security, and in 
which the state acts as the protector of its population from both external and internal threats 
(Locke, 2003).  Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1991), expanded this theory to identify 
the three responsibilities of the state as the provision of justice, defense, and public goods to 
citizens because private citizens were either unwilling or incapable of providing these for 
themselves.  Of these two assumptions, in post-colonial states only one holds, which affects the 
strategies used by politicians to achieve their goals.  No matter the system, politicians will act to 
maintain political power.  Buchanan and Tullock (1979) have hypothesized that political survival 
is the primary objective for politicians who cannot be seen simply as ―platonic guardians‖ of the 
public good.   
  The social contract that exists between citizen and state, however, does not exist in those 
states that accepted the existing colonial power structure after independence.  This absence in 
these states is a result of the method of government construction in colonial possessions.  In 
colonial states, governments were borne of conquest and domination by foreign actors rather 
than of collective action by the domestic population. Crawford Young (1997), uses the Kikongo 
words ―Bula Matari‖ or the crusher of rocks to describe the colonial state as he asserts that 
  
24 
colonial rule was based on a system of vicious extraction by colonial officials which had a 
transformative impact on the nature of the state by breaking the link between citizen and state.   
Representatives of Colonial governments, because they were not beholden to the domestic 
population for their political survival, structured the government with the intention of insulating 
themselves from the needs and demands of the native population.  Post-colonial political elites 
adopted this structure and character but adapted it to the fact that now, their fortunes were 
attached to a domestic constituency.  After independence  in most former colonies, what Goran 
Hyden (2005)  called ―movement politics‖ were an effort to build national unity, but most of 
these attempts to build consensus among the disparate and conflicting social groups were 
discarded as the administration lost any economic incentive because of the injection of foreign 
capital. When the state requires input of resources and trust from the whole populace in order to 
function, we see efforts to engage the entire population.      
  Charles Tilly (1990) describes this process of state building in the creation of European 
nation states.  External threats obliged feudal governments to levy taxes on their citizens and 
compel them to service in the military and in exchange, rulers provided security and other public 
goods with the resources extracted from the population.  This system of state creation required 
all people to provide resources and in turn meant that all people expected benefits from the state.  
In post-colonial states, on the other hand, the administration was never challenged to protect its 
borders and therefore never developed the capacity to extend power across its territory; instead, 
it concentrated all of the government capacity and power on the area surrounding the seat of 
political power, the capital city.  This strategy of rule, regardless of the ethno-religious tensions 
that exist in a country, create a core and a marginalized constituency within the population. The 
marginalized population is comprised of those people who live farthest from the capital; the core 
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constituency is those people who enjoy state services, and protections as they live close enough 
to the capital that the resources required for service provision remain minimal (Herbst; 2000).  
Political elites seek to appease the core constituency because spatially they pose the greatest 
challenge to government function.  A rebellion at the edges of the capital city poses a 
significantly greater chance of halting state function and doing physical harm to elected officials 
and domestic power players than one at the remote border (Fearon; 2004).  Politicians, out of 
necessity, focus their resources primarily on those people who pose the greatest threat.  
   Because this system of accountability and stewardship does not, like a social contract, 
connect the electoral success of individual politicians to the success of the national population 
but to specific sectors of the population, two other assumptions about the relationship between 
people and the state and the preferences of the state in democratic or semi-democratic countries 
cannot hold.  I will present and then discuss the importance of these assumptions.   
a.) Democracies are less prone to internal violence and, in the event of rebellion, the 
government will seek to end the conflict as quickly as possible to protect the interests 
of its population and retain political influence. 
b.)  If violence persists in a democratic state, the cause is some characteristic of the rebel 
unit rather than of the state, as the political life of elites is predicated on their ability 
to protect the population. 
  Skocpol and Goodwin theorized that democracies should be able to better address 
grievances and work towards negotiated settlement, increasing the likelihood of a negotiated 
settlement in war because it is in the best interest of politicians to end conflict quickly while 
preserving their domestic constituencies (1984).  I argue, however, that in the absence of a social 
contract between political elites and the entire population and the presence of consistent 
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international assistance (military, developmental, and humanitarian),  states can effectively 
discount the demands of the affected population as long as the conflict does not threaten key 
constituencies in the domestic center of political gravity, the capital.  With the injection of 
foreign capital, the international community in effect becomes an external constituency that, 
because of the administration’s dependence on its financial contribution, carries enormous 
political weight domestically.  Historically, structural adjustment programs have been used to 
shift the preferences of the state; states have been forced to make cuts to social spending in order 
to receive the loans.  By interceding between the primary domestic constituency and the 
government, international aid is recreating the conditions that were present in colonial 
administrations when politicians could ostensibly ignore the demands of the population because 
the fortunes of political figures were not tied exclusively to the public evaluation of politicians’ 
performance domestically.  This point is crucial for understanding the duration of civil war 
because if the preferences of the state can be shifted to privilege the goals of an alternative 
constituency, we can assume that the `state will not always pursue policies that are best suited for 
its population.   
 A second constituency that can intercede between the domestic population and the 
national government in semi-democratic states is the military.  Where civilian control of the 
military is not a foregone conclusion, research suggests that governments will allocate more 
resources to defense budgets rather than to social programs or fiscal control policies (Collier and 
Hoeffler; 2006).  Currently in Africa, ten out of 54 incumbent governments are headed by the 
leaders of coups  (For a list of leaders and countries please see Appendix A).  This does not even 
address incumbent leaders that were rebel leaders who emerged from the military.  Post-colonial 
African leadership, even in countries where there has been significant time since a coup attempt, 
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is acutely aware of the threat posed by the military and therefore the military itself become a 
separate constituency with needs for resources that cannot be deferred, even with the intercession 
of the international community into domestic politics.  
  Once we accept the argument that states preferences can be shifted depending on the 
actors that hold power in domestic decision-making, we can also argue that even in democracies, 
in the hierarchy of preferences, peace and security may not always be the primary goal of the 
state, given what we know about the goals and preferences of individual politicians.  Common 
knowledge in democratic theory, as shown by Skocpol and Goodwin’s assessment of democracy 
and conflict, is that peace is always preferable to conflict and that democracies are better suited 
to address conflict.  This hypothesis supposes that the preference for peace is an ―increasing 
preference‖ where values of A, in this case ―peace‖, are always less desirable.  But in the context 
of the incentive structure created when international aid and low level conflict are both present in 
a political environment, peace – for politicians - becomes a single peaked preference.  Single 
peaked preferences represent commodities where the ideal value of A is such that with values 
less than A more is preferred but in values greater than A less is preferred. On a scale that 
represents the degrees of peace ranging from 0 to 1 where zero represents all out war and 1 
represents complete peace, in the political environment where international aid and some conflict 
is present, peace is not the ideal preference for the state as there are additional benefits that are 
available from some value of conflict greater than .5 but less than 1.   
  The interactive effects of low-level peripheral conflict and international assistance work 
to insulate political elites from their constituencies in three key ways:  
1. In low-level peripheral conflict, the domestic constituency is divided into the affected 
and core constituencies, where the core constituency is those people who live closest to 
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the center of government power and can expect to maintain influence of the decision 
making of the state. The affected constituency, because it places high demands on the  
sitting government but is often perceived to be in opposition to the sitting government 
given the presence of the rebel forces is politically marginalized without direct action by 
the state, reducing the ability of oppositional groups to develop viable political 
leadership and/or organize politically to support existing oppositional candidates.    
2. In low level, peripheral conflicts, the military can be warehoused farther away from the 
center of political power and resources can be legitimately allocated to defense budgets to 
appease senior officers and loosely controlled predation on the part of junior officers and 
enlisted men can be tolerated as the constituencies most affected are either neighboring 
states or the communities affected by war. 
3. Conflict, even low- level peripheral conflict can help secure easier terms in aid 
negotiation for states facing such conflict. International conditions on assistance can be 
challenged, and if not completely disregarded, at least modified to remove some of the 
conditions set by international lenders and donors.  Active conflict provides political 
cover for the allocation of resources to the military as well as for the unequal distribution 
of funds marked for social security spending and development.  
  In short, the interactive effect of low level peripheral conflict and international aid 
changes the dynamics of domestic power relationships between the three key constituencies of 
semi-democratic states and the state by empowering the state domestically as a field marshal 
responsible for directing the military and deciding which parts of the populations receive the 
protection of the state  its population and internationally by providing the political cover 
necessary when the states shirks the conditions placed on loans and aid in the name of 
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emergency politics.  In this situation then, civil war is a tool that can be used by savvy politicians 
to insulate themselves both domestically and internationally from political challenge. Here 
though, I do not contend that politicians willingly start civil wars or fund them to achieve these 
conditions but only that once a conflict has begun,  there are fewer incentives to bring it to an 
end.  Conflict will continue as long as the cost of ending civil war remains higher than the 
benefits received from allowing it to continue.   
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THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
Given the above theory of state preferences, we can expect to see some strategies, such as the 
extension of conflict, employed by politicians in order to maintain power that in functional 
democracies would not be acceptable political decisions given politicians’ direct link to a 
broader domestic constituency. In institutionalized democracies, where limits on the power of the 
central government are respected and elections actually do serve the purpose of punishing or 
rewarding politicians for performance, politicians do not have the political cover to allow this 
sort of conflict without losing their posts. In countries where low level peripheral conflict is 
ongoing, the resources required to end the conflict are calculated to be higher than those required 
to maintain but restrict conflict.  
 In this section I discuss the ways that low level peripheral conflict can be politically 
useful when managing the expectations and requirements of each of the key constituencies and 
also suggest ways that, if so inclined, key actors can work to shift the preferences of states 
towards peace. In this project I define a constituency as ―A group served by an organization or 
institution; a clientele‖ (The American Heritage Dictionary, 2000) rather than simply the voting 
population of a district or state.  The use of a broader definition is required here to include those 
groups necessary for politicians to attain, and subsequently maintain, political office.  In 
countries where it retains its independence, the military can pose significant threat to the elected 
leadership.  If elected officials do not have the support of the military, they open themselves to 
both intragovernmental and extra governmental challenges that increase the likelihood of violent 
regime change.  Finally, the international donor community is the last key constituency for 
domestic politicians.   
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In countries that depend on the injection of foreign capital to stay afloat, the maintenance 
of goodwill in the international donor community is vital for the survival of domestic politicians.  
Loans and assistance not only ensure the continuance of basic state functions but they often 
provide the capital necessary to maintain circles of patronage within the population.  If domestic 
leaders cannot garner the support of the international donor community or allocate funds from 
the extraction of high rent primary commodities, they have little to offer their public.  Savvy 
politicians understand that when they lose international support, they open themselves to 
domestic political challenge.  Examples of leaders who have recognized the need to advocate for 
their political tenure with all three key constituencies exist in Africa, but the longevity statistics 
on African leaders are still startling: as of 1991 59.4% of African leaders had been killed, 
imprisoned, or exiled as a consequence of holding political office (Wiseman, 1993).  This is not 
a consequence, William Reno notes, of the corruption of African leaders, but a sign that the 
leader had lost control of the political opposition or rival strongmen in their country and became 
vulnerable to political challenge and subsequent removal (Reno; 1999). 
State- International Community Relations 
 
  The first set of actors that place restrictions on the activities of the state is the foreign 
constituency that is comprised of donor countries and international financial institutions that 
assess future loans based on the ability of a country to fulfill the obligations that are part and 
parcel of foreign capital investment.  An important way to frame the connection between 
domestic and international politics involves Putnam’s notion of the "two-level game," a general 
equilibrium theory that posits the simultaneous interaction of domestic and international events 
that shape decision-making  (Putnam, 1988).  Putnam’s game theory is applied generally to the 
negotiation and ratification of international treaties. In this case, domestic leadership is 
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simultaneously using domestic conflict as political excuse for why previous conditions and goals 
set by international donors have not been met, while using the promise of international aid as a 
method of domestic pacification by promising his key domestic constituents expanded access to 
resources on the condition that they continue to support him politically.  Generally, researchers 
use two level game theory when explaining the negotiation of new international treaties.  In this 
case, the model is useful in explaining the negotiating strategies domestic politicians engage in to 
rally support for themselves as leaders and to solidify their position with their key domestic and 
international constituencies.    
    Distinguishing between international assistance and the international community that 
comprises one of the constituencies of the state is important.  International aid is non-agentic and 
is part of a political strategy of domestic constituent management while the international 
community has interests and preferences with which domestic leaders must contend.    Because 
post-colonial states initially had no impetus to construct state tax structures that could provide a 
dependable capital stream, elected officials either had to improve extractive capacity or find 
capital elsewhere.  Without capital to allocate to those constituencies whose favor is necessary to 
maintain power, politicians cannot expect to retain political office   
  International assistance injects the capital that domestic politicians need to retain the 
political support of key constituencies, as it is essentially a disposable resource.  Although 
conditions for international aid often stipulate that the funds be spent on development projects, 
the money is funneled through state apparatuses that can redirect the funds and the portions that 
do get invested in development can be targeted at the portions of the population  a politician 
needs.  Unlike primary commodities that are location specific ―rents‖ that can be captured by 
rebel units and endanger the function of the state, international assistance is easily defendable. 
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Rebel threats to its resource base cannot, therefore, be used to pressure the central government to 
end the war.  International aid also insulates the state and its primary constituencies from the 
negative externalities of war such as economic decline in war-affected areas, the destruction of 
infrastructure, and loss of life.   
  International donors and financial institutions shape political decision making in two key 
ways: by using political and economic pressure to force the state to account for the allocation of 
international funds and, by providing legitimacy for leaders through both immaterial and 
material support that shapes the perceptions of domestic populations.  When their regime lacks 
legitimacy within their own populations , political leaders can assign credit for negotiations for 
new international aid and foreign investment contracts to their administration.  But when rulers 
are seeking to effect the decision making process of international donors, they can present the 
needs of their constituency or current events such as conflicts, famines, or other emergencies as a 
method of shedding the restrictions placed on spending or economic decisions.  This ability to 
play the domestic and international constituencies against each other frees politicians to use the 
resources of the state for personal objectives. In the following section, I discuss the ways in 
which we can expect international assistance and peripheral conflicts to affect the nature of the 
relationships between the state and key actors in domestic politics: the military and domestic 
population. 
Civil-State Relations 
 
 In a democratic system, politicians are the empowered agents of the population and, 
therefore, as representatives of the wishes and preferences of the majority of the population. 
With appropriate checks and balances on government actions, minority rights will be respected 
and incorporated into the policy goals of the state.  This vision of a properly functioning 
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democracy is predicated on two assumptions: that representatives are placed in government as 
direct representatives of their constituencies and that the preferences of all voters are represented. 
The state, functioning as an interest aggregator, should produce policies with which all people 
are unequally happy (or unhappy) and if politicians do not adequately represent the interests of 
their voting constituencies, those that feel excluded from the decision-making may use their vote 
to punish politicians.  If politicians with national voting constituencies want to maintain political 
power, they should consider the preferences of the population and try to represent a moderate 
position that does not disproportionately disadvantage any part of the population (Downs; 1957) .   
In post-colonial semi-democratic states, however, the incentive structure that encourages 
equal representation and curbs the individualistic use of political power is much weaker.  The 
―degree of democracy‖ experienced by individuals is conditioned by two factors: the cost of 
providing constituents with public goods paid by political elites and the buffer mechanisms 
available to politicians that limit the ability of voters to evaluate the policy decision of politicians 
and either punish or reward them.  Jeffrey Herbst provides examples of three mechanisms used 
by politicians used to insulate themselves from the demands of the population.  A low-level 
peripheral conflict added to the political environment accomplishes the same goal of limiting the 
participation of domestic oppositional forces by marginalizing certain portions of the population.  
This section will discuss the conditions that lead to a political situation in which the provision of 
public security is not a rational action for politicians  and explain how the addition of conflict 
into this political environment can be politically useful and , more importantly, that the benefits 
of ending conflict are lesser than the disadvantages of allowing it to continue.   
  
35 
Jeffrey Herbst argues that a theory of state consolidation is necessary apart from the 
traditionally Eurocentric models for state consolidation based on conquest
6
.   To achieve this 
goal, he identifies three determinants of strong state consolidation: the cost of extending power, 
the nature of state boundaries or ―buffer mechanisms‖, and the pressures of the interstate system.  
He defines the costs of power projection in African states as the dispersion of the population over 
the land, the amount of capital necessary, and the ecological factors that would facilitate or deter 
expansion;   buffer mechanisms are policies or boundaries that mitigate pressures from external 
actors on the state and lower the cost of power projection (25).  Herbst's examples of these 
mechanisms include fixed national boundaries and citizenship and migration policies. 
The state structure inherited by post-colonial leaders of semi-democratic states was 
particularly limited.  Colonial leadership did not intend to provide state services to the entire 
population and therefore did not extend the reach of the state past the core of the country which 
they used as a clearing house for colonial products and a base for the colonial administration.  
Treatment by the state and resources allocated to individuals were functions of their affiliation 
with the colonial regime.  Those who were privileged during the regime had personal 
connections with the colonial administrators or had enough domestic power that they could 
garner influence.  
 After independence, the system of politics and governance in these states did not change.  
Those with direct access to political elites had the greatest access to the bounty of the state.  This 
method of governance is what Goran Hyden calls the ―economy of affection‖ Favors are traded 
for political support because the very limited role for the diffuse support of democracy or any 
administration creates a more pragmatic view of government.  Max Weber describes this type of 
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system as a patrimonial rule where power is personalized and therefore the activities of the state 
become an extension of a leader’s personal beneficence. He describes the political administration 
as a ―purely personal affair of the ruler, and the political power is considered part of his personal 
property‖  Further, ―the office and the exercise of public authority serve the ruler and the official 
on which the office was bestowed; they do not serve impersonal purposes.‖  (Weber; 1968)   
When international assistance is added to this system, elected officials essentially become 
super-patrons as their access to resources is unparalleled by non-governmental elites.  
Theoretically, this would encourage patrons to expand their circles of patronage to include more 
of the population but this will occur only if new sectors of the population have the ability to 
threaten or reward politicians.  Political leaders, recognizing that resources are finite will only 
use their power when they perceive that the exercise of that power will improve either their 
personal status or their chances of maintaining access to the power and resources of the state.   
This is supported by Hyden’s (2005) analysis of the relationship between state and 
society as the ―problematic state‖ in Africa. He examines the role of the community in nascent 
states after colonialism, concluding that colonial leaders saw the community as a hurdle to 
overcome for effective management of the colony.  After independence, domestic community 
leaders that had previously been subjected to the absolutist rule of the state took over the task of 
governance but because they had had no ties to the construction of the official state during the 
colonial era but which was accepted structurally by post-independence political leaders, they 
treated it as prey rather than a mechanism of political management.  Hyden also concludes that 
the state is ―embedded‖ in society or subject to the whims of social linkages rather than rule 
bound and above society. He fails to consider, however, that relative and actual distance of the 
central government from certain segments of the population is much more dramatic; varying 
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degrees of connectivity exist among the population and elites.  Therefore, while his analysis of 
the motivations of politicians is astute the conclusion as to what that means regarding a 
politician’s relationship with the population is flawed given the nature of state administrations in 
Africa.   
Herbst’s  (2000)  description of the  failure to extend the state means that the state rarely 
directly interacts with populations outside of urban centers, creating a subordinate area that is 
isolated geographically and politically from the power center.  The subordinate area exists 
outside the control of the state and without the benefits of public goods provided by the state; 
this marginalized population has little incentive or ability to participate in the larger state 
economy and feels minimal loyalty to the distant state.  This limited loyalty is mirrored by 
national leaders as they are not inclined to spend their political resources on a population that is 
only tangentially associated with their ability to maintain political power.    
 The method of state access is crucial in this analysis of state-civil relations because not 
only does it define how individuals gain access to state resources but ,more importantly, how 
people are excluded from access to the state and what motivates politicians to provide for certain 
sectors of the population over others.  If Buchanan and Tullock’s supposition about the 
motivations of politicians is true, we can expect politicians to spend political capital only when it 
will lead to political gain, and if there are avenues to avoid spending political capital without 
political consequences, politicians will use these strategems.  
 These are what Herbst calls buffer mechanisms.  He argues that there are strategies of 
rule that limit the expectations for and restrictions on the resources of the state. I propose an 
addition to Herbst’s theory in that I contend that conflict is one of these buffer mechanisms as it 
has the capacity for limiting the ability of the opposition to organize or fully participate in 
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politics.  In ―Distinctive Political Logic of Weak States‖ William Reno (1999) argues that rulers 
in weak states that feel threatened by political adversaries will often systematically cripple the 
arms of the state, thereby vesting the potential power of the state in a small group of elites and 
making charismatic leaders an ―essential‖ part of the government.  In democratic states the 
destruction of the limited capacity of the state would be seen as repressive and would garner the 
attention of the international community as undemocratic.  Conflict, however, provides political 
cover for the focus of the state on only those areas that serve to strengthen the political profile of 
domestic elites.  David Keen (2000) asks us to consider war not as a chaotic and destructive 
force for all involved,  but as a systematic method of manipulating existing political and 
economic conditions where the depiction of chaos combined with strategic violence, which can 
reverse traditional power structures of domination and subjugation, bring economic benefits 
and/or reorient the state and transfer the allocation of resources of the state to historically 
excluded groups.  This targeted use of violence changes the nature of the economy and political 
structure but does not destroy the overall economy.  The argument here is not that political elites 
will either start or directly contribute to the execution of the war, but that as long as the war does 
not pose significant threat to those sectors of the population that hold sway over politicians or 
that might be beneficial to those constituencies, there is little impetus to mobilize the resources 
required to terminate the conflict completely.   
State- Military Relations 
 
The second relationship that is key to understanding how civil war duration can be used 
as a political tool to empower the state is that between the military and the state.  Regardless of 
the historical era, hard-pressed rulers have used theft from neighbors or helped followers to steal 
as a key component to consolidate domestic political bargains. Incumbent rulers have recognized 
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that predation or scavenging for resources solves short-term problems of political control by 
keeping soldiers occupied.  Deployment to peripheral areas within the country also removes 
them from the center of political power thereby decreasing the hypothetical threat posed by an 
underpaid and underemployed security community. This section will discuss the three ways in 
which the continuation of low level conflict is politically useful: conflict provides political cover 
for state predation and human rights violations; it allows the maintenance of defense budgets;  
and it prevents leaders from having to undertake security sector reform as that is politically 
treacherous, expensive and therefore undesirable.   
  In their study of military spending and coup attempts Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 
(2006) concluded that in states where the perceived risk of coup d’état is high, leaders will 
increase military spending to appease the military.  By providing more resources for military 
leadership, leaders build a circle of patronage strong enough to deter both the highest echelons of 
military leadership from seeking a change in leadership and also wide enough to prevent what 
Jimmy Kandeh (2004) calls sub-altern coups or junior officer coup attempts.  Kandeh’s key 
variable is ―the degree to which the exercise of political power overlaps with wealth 
accumulation.‖  Where power and wealth overlap, exerting the authority necessary to control 
those within the ranks is impossible because mutineers understand that senior officers are 
―stiffing‖ the ranks and excluding them from the tightening circle of patronage but in states 
where there is conflict, conflict provides political cover. 
 To prevent the incidence of coups, the clientalistic circles must remain wide enough to 
include those that are likely to usurp hierarchies of power; junior officers must be allowed 
sufficient leeway to find alternative sources of income.  International aid structures and donor 
interest is the fuel that feeds the system of auto-predation and explains why a country with 
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limited ―lootable‖ resources maintains the interest in conflict.  Reno discusses this method of 
threat pacification as the ―warlord politics‖ during which vulnerable leaders expand client 
networks to include those actors that are most likely to threaten their grasp on political power, 
effectively ensuring limited threats to political change (Reno, 1999). This tendency, if left 
unchecked, can draw the attention of the international community as it inevitably means looting 
state resources that could be used for national development and is often associated with a rise in 
human rights violations.      
Another tactic of insecure leaders with an autonomous military is the limited state control 
over military predation.  This strategy, coupled with a tenuous link between citizen and state, 
primes the system for the marginalization of certain areas and groups as collateral damage and 
becomes integrated into the strategy of rule.  Because border protection, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa, is extremely weak, armies and militias take advantage of porous boundaries to 
loot resources from neighboring countries and bring the actual products back across to countries 
where it is easier to sell and ship their product while the central government looks the other way 
(Reno; 2002).  Paul Collier’s theory on rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity (2000) implies that 
rebel success is a function of state capacity; rebels will be more successful if the state is weak or 
does not have the resources available to combat them.  In many African conflicts, this conclusion 
seems intuitive given the rampant institutional weakness on the continent; some states in Africa, 
however,  have developed comparatively stable institutions.  In those states we must either 
assume that maintaining the conflict is politically useful and state predation is not simply a 
negative externality of uncontrolled conflict or fall into simpler attribution of all pillage to 
undisciplined rebel units. 
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International donors, while not exclusively concerned with human rights violations,  are 
particularly sensitive to respect for property rights as many have international business interests 
in developing countries . The unregulated use of violence and rapacity on the part of any force in 
a country is likely to draw the attention of international donors and decrease faith in the ability of 
the state to competently address violence within its borders.  Schnabel and Erhart suggest that the 
post-modern soldier has many functions: policeman, diplomat, social worker, peace corp 
volunteer and the definition of what it means to be a soldier is ever changing (Schnabel, 2006).  
In developing countries soldiers have a repertoire of identities as well but they also include titles 
like business man, security personnel, and hired gun, which means that the official function of 
the military gets muddled when mixed with personal objectives of resource accumulation.  The 
state, as Herbst points out, is equipped with the ability to defend itself from international scrutiny 
given the nature of state sovereignty and so the ability to defer attention away from the potential 
abuses of the military is politically convenient but not a sufficient reason for prolonging conflict.  
It is, however, not the only advantage to low level conflict.  In cases where the military is 
accustomed to significant resources, conflict provides the justification for comparatively high 
levels of defense spending.  A common tactic used in the developing world by military leaders is 
papering the payrolls with ghost troops, or troops that have been killed or deserted but still 
receive pay checks that are then pocketed by leadership (UPDF Commanders Confess to 
Existence of Ghost Soldiers, 2009).  While this happens all over the developing world and does 
not require a conflict, domestic oversight bodies are less careful and the restrictions placed on 
defense spending by international financial institutions have been relaxed for countries 
experiencing civil war or political instability.    
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Ongoing conflict in post-colonial countries allows political elites to defer any attempt at 
security sector reform.  Security sector reform generally is avoided in peace agreements, as it is 
complicated and requires careful apportionment across social and ethnic groups or it can be a 
source of resentment in the population.  Schnabel and Erhart (2006) detail eleven key activities 
necessary for real security reform, all of which work to diversify the military while building 
strong norms and institutions of protocol that limit not only  the individuals in the military but 
also  the ways in which politicians can use the military.  Because security sector reform seeks to 
professionalize the military and its relations with the population,  the limits on what they can be 
used for can be politically disadvantageous to political leaders who are accustomed to having an 
ally in the military and being able to use the security community as personal security and a 
method of indirect political repression of oppositional candidates.  During conflict, the 
opposition can be characterized as sympathetic to the rebel forces and leaders can call on the 
military to prevent effective political organization by harassing or detaining political elites and 
critics of the sitting government.  This strategy was used in South Africa with the arrest of 
Nelson Mandela but reportedly has also been used extensively by leaders like Omar Bashir of 
Sudan and more recently by the Kagame regime in Rwanda.   
By allowing conflict to continue, savvy politicians can empower themselves as 
representatives of the state to reduce political challenges and stifle domestic unrest while 
maintaining international status and, more importantly, a steady stream of international 
development aid and military aid.  Jeffrey Herbst contends that by manipulating the norms of the 
international system African states qualify as system makers despite their marginal position in 
the global economy.  If this is true, by capitalizing on international concern over political 
instability and desire to see their investments succeed, leaders in the developing world can 
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ensure continued support from the international community.  Domestically, leaders can use 
political instability to reduce opposition, maintain the support of the military thereby reducing 
the chance of coup, and insulate themselves from difficult administrative tasks such as the 
0reform of the security community and building stronger political institutions.    
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METHODS 
The aim of this paper is to construct a conceptual/analytical paradigm that offers an 
alternative approach to understanding the duration of civil war as a function of state preferences 
rather than exclusively the capacity or character of the rebel unit.  The lack of data and resources 
restricts the scope of the project and my capacity to test my theory across all cases.  The main 
task of this research is, therefore, to demonstrate that there are observable and verifiable cases in 
which the duration of low level peripheral civil war is a function of change in state preferences 
so that war becomes not a threat to the state but a tool that allows political elites to pacify 
domestic constituencies while the state continues to function.  
To examine this case I use theory guided process tracing (TGPT) in a case study which 
allows for ―the detailed examination of an aspect of historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events‖ (George and Bennett; 2005).  
In particular, process-tracing ―focuses on sequential process within a particular historical case, 
not the correlation of data across cases‖ which is crucial in this project as the main argument is 
that the political calculations of domestic elites are the key determinants of civil war duration 
rather than a more readily quantifiable variable such as primary commodities or ethnic divisions.   
Specifically I have chosen to follow Buthe’s method of process tracing that examines 
historical narratives and the method presumes endogeneity (2002).  This is methodologically 
useful because when studies seek to incorporate relatively long time horizons,  changes in 
variables that are endogenous to the dependent variable can significantly change actors’ 
preferences, options, and strategies.  In civil war duration we must choose models that allow for 
endogeneity because prior research has shown that in the analysis of conflict duration, time is an 
element of causal explanation.  Particularly in civil conflict, the inclusion of time as a factor is 
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suggested by scholars such as Zartman (2001) who see conflict as a waiting game during which a 
moment of ripeness is essential for conflict termination.  Buthe claims that TGPT is useful for 
developing a new set of variables, redefining current variables or building theory, but is not 
suitable for theory testing.  While I recognize the limitations of process tracing and will discuss 
them below I agree with Peter Hall in his assertion that ―theory guided process tracing is an 
epistemologically superior method in that it can map the ontological complexity of the social 
world and also rule out competing theories,‖ (Hall; 2003).  Process tracing is generally more 
rigorous than other qualitative methods  and provides an alternative to quantitative methods, 
particularly in phenomenon that do not lend themselves to large-N testing such as prolonged civil 
conflict or theory building (Falleti; 2006). Process tracing identifies a causal chain that links 
independent and dependent variables (Bennett and George 2005: 206-07) and, therefore, can help 
identify masked variables presently absent from models  that have facilitated the protraction of 
conflict.  Methodologically, process-tracing provides the how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts 
for mechanism-based accounts of social change.  However, it also directs one to trace the process 
in a very specific, theoretically informed way. 
 The limitation of process tracing and qualitative theory as a whole is that it is not 
conducive to generalizable theories that are widely applicable.  By focusing on the specific case 
mechanisms rather than large N data sample, we necessarily limit the initial applicability of any 
theories developed, but I hope to use this project to stimulate further thought not simply on 
Uganda but on the definition and identification of variables in duration research.  Essentially the 
parsimony of quantitative research is sacrificed here as the price we pay for examining complex 
causality.  Further,  by using process tracing I hope to move beyond the either/or debates on the 
definition of key variables such as state capacity in an attempt to ―inductively identify new 
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variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths  (George and Bennett 2005, 75). 
George and Bennett suggest that cases whose outcomes contradict the prediction of conventional 
theories should be used in this type of case study because they may help demonstrate new 
hypotheses or causal mechanisms. To build a theory on a theory-guided case study would first 
require the identification of these unconventional cases. 
I have chosen the war in Northern Uganda, an apparent anomaly in civil war cases,  
because it is the longest running civil war on the African continent (1987-Present) and much of 
the existing literature has theoretically thrown up its hands and largely attributes the duration of 
this conflict, not to rational calculation on the part of the combatants, but to religious 
fundamentalism, deep seated ethnic hatred, or the continued depravity  of the leadership of the 
rebel movement. This abdication of rational theory stems from the frustration of many of the 
theoretical expectations in civil war duration associated with the impact of state capacity  I seek 
both to reintroduce rationality to the case and identify the salient determinants of conflict and to 
reject the idea that because Uganda’s civil war has continued so long, it is an aberrant case 
among civil wars.   
I argue, however,  that Uganda should not be considered anomalous but representative of 
a post-colonial developing state.  It is not the case itself that is inherently unique but our inability 
to explain adequately the duration of its civil war.  As in many other post-colonial states, ethnic 
tensions were borne of the strategy of divide and rule that allocated state employment on the 
basis of European conclusions on the character of ethnic group.  Also as in other post-colonial 
states, at independence, domestic leadership accepted the existing state institutions and traditions 
including the location of the capital city, military institutions, and method of managing domestic 
constituencies and projecting state power.  Unlike other post-colonial states, Uganda has an 
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exceptionally high ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF) value of .93 out of 1, but within 
the country, very clear dominant and marginalized tribes or tribal groupings exist.  The Southern 
tribes are often referred to as a one group, whereas the Acholi and Lango tribes are only 
infrequently identified as the Luo people which identifies them by language,  and more 
commonly designated as individual groups.  Uganda, like many other post colonial states has a 
history of post independence civil conflict that has impacted the way in which state power is 
allocated, with the Acholi being almost completely removed from the center of political power.  
 And finally, Uganda like many other states in Africa came into existence in the fourth 
wave of democracy.  These states are characterized by their incomplete construction of 
democratic institutions and generally flimsy commitment to constitutional limitations.  These 
characteristics suggest that Uganda, rather than an aberrant case that can be understood only as 
an unlikely combination of factors, is in fact representative of many other post-colonial states.  
Additionally, because it is part of the developing world, Uganda shares the same international 
position in global power politics that many other developing states do, subject to the same 
conditions and requirements of donor nations and international financial institutions. These facts 
further reinforce my characterization of Uganda as a representative case, which means that, 
theoretically, conclusions gained from this study can be expanded and applied to a broader 
sample of cases in the future.   
 The proposed study has a single general argument, generated from the literature, 
regarding the relationship between domestic power relationships as fueled by international actors 
and civil war duration. 
Argument: The maintenance of low intensity, peripheral conflict coupled with the 
injection of foreign capital successfully insulates elected officials from challenges to their 
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political tenure by their three key constituencies, thereby reducing the incentives to end 
conflict. 
We can expect the interaction of these two factors, low intensity peripheral conflict and high 
levels of foreign aid, to reduce the likelihood of war termination by empowering the state in its 
relationships with three salient political actors in domestic politics: the domestic constituency, 
the military, the international community.   
 In the case of Uganda, the duration of civil conflict can be attributed to the lack of 
credible positive or negative inducements for the state to end the war from either the domestic or 
international constituencies.  Specifically, the political benefits domestically and the financial 
benefits that come from the international community are key in understanding civil war duration.  
Domestically, a low intensity and protracted conflict that is geographically removed from the 
center of political power shapes the power relationships between state and society, state and the 
military, and finally the branches of government by reducing the expectations surrounding the 
provision of government services and protection.  Internationally, to prevent donor restrictions, 
civil conflict can be used as a cover for the diversion of resources to the military, corruption, and 
unequal distribution of aid and the evasion of conditions placed on loans and debt relief.   
 To evaluate this theory I analyze economic data, military spending and deployment 
patterns, state development spending, political interaction between state and society, and the 
growth of the state relative to its control of its territory.  The sources required for the proposed 
project are accessible through donor records, official state records, data from non-governmental 
organizations, news reports and data collected by international financial institutions.  By looking 
at the broader patterns, I hope to reintroduce Ugandan politicians as rational actors and key 
players in Ugandan politics that maneuver within the system to retain power.   
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 After my discussion of the situation in Uganda, I conclude with a fuller discussion of the 
determinants of civil war duration in Uganda, not as anomalous, but as a broader political tactic 
that can be replicated in countries that have the same scope conditions as the Ugandan case.  The 
conditions that are necessary are common factors that are present in other developing countries. 
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CASE STUDY: THE WAR IN NORTHERN UGANDA 
Given the preceding presentation of the conflict in Northern Uganda and the literature 
addressing the determinants of duration, I assert that we have been fundamentally 
misinterpreting the factors that have allowed the conflict to continue for 24 years by focusing on 
the rebel faction rather than the stronger government forces.  Optimistic estimates suggest that 
the Lord’s Resistance Army consists of roughly 3,000 troops spread across northern Uganda, 
southern Sudan, and western DRC (Living with the LRA: The Juba Peace Initiative, 2007).  This 
force is made up of approximately one third children and 20% of the adult population of LRA 
combatants are ―wives‖7 of the soldiers.  These numbers mean 1,400, or almost half of the rebel 
strength is women and children.  By contrast, the government’s force strength is from 50-60,000 
troops (not including militias), some 20,000 of which are deployed exclusively in the north of 
Uganda (Willans; 2007).  After the 2002 Anti-terrorism bill in Uganda, the Uganda People’s 
Defense Force (UPDF) has also had the benefit of capacity building training and support of the 
United States and despite the cap of 1.9% of GDP set by the International Monetary Fund, 
military expenditure in 2006 was 2.2% of GDP allowing for greater spending on weapons and 
troops in the field (World Bank, 1960-2010).  With the entire state being roughly the same size 
as Oregon, and with a peace agreement and the cooperation of the Sudanese government since 
1999, how has the ―ragtag‖ rebel force been able to elude the better manned, supplied and 
supported UPDF? 
 To answer this question, I suggest that a low intensity conflict in the boundary areas of 
the country coupled with international assistance allows the ruling elites of Uganda to 
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manipulate the power dynamics of domestic politics to assure their re-election or continued 
access to political power.  This project aims to assign rational motivation to the primary actors in 
the conflict and question current literature that both focuses strongly on the rebel factions as the 
primary proponent and rejects the popular understanding of the conflict as a decent into madness.  
The analysis of the conflict examines the three primary relationships in Ugandan politics as 
suggested by the literature and the above theory: the state-military, state civil, and state- 
international relationships.  The power relationships created with active conflict are unique and if 
the conflict were to end politicians would have to find a new method of maintaining office that 
would likely be more costly politically in terms of the effort required to gain political support.  I 
discuss each factor and then more broadly explain how each is politically relevant to the 
perpetuation of the conflict.  Finally, I conclude that Uganda does not represent a unique or 
unusual case but that the leadership in Uganda is maximizing its ability to maintain political 
dominance by subjugating those communities that are unlikely to support them and empowering 
and isolating the parts of the population that are likely to present the greatest challenge to the 
consolidation of power.   
Background of the Conflict: 
 
 Uganda gained independence in 1962 and the period following the regime change 
between 1962-1964 was one of unusual relative peace and security in Uganda post independence 
history.  In the 48 years since independence, there have been 9 national administrations, every 
one of which except the current one has been replaced through violent event, either war or coup
8
.  
Over the course of Uganda’s post-colonial history, in addition to the coups and declared wars, 
                                                 
8
 In 1980 there was an election to re-elect Milton Obote but it is widely accepted that the election was rigged and 
was the catalyst  for Yoweri Museveni’s entrance into rebellion as he promised before the election that, if the votes 
were rigged the National Resistance Movement would go into the bush to fight.   
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there have also been over 20 documented insurgencies, most of which have originated from the 
Northern and Western part of the country (Fredrick; 2009).  Exceptions were the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni that emerged from the Luwero district in 
central Uganda and the Ugandan People’s Army that emerged just after the NRA under the 
command of Peter Otai and which would later be incorporated into the national military.  After a 
brief presentation of the history of the conflict followed by a discussion of the rebel movement 
and its relationship with the Northern populations, I describe the evolution of the Museveni 
government’s relationship with his three key constituencies. This provides evidence that the 
duration of the war in Northern Uganda can be interpreted not as simply a weak African nation 
struggling for peace but as a nation whose politicians have employed a political strategy of 
neglect as they have seen the benefits of a low level peripheral insurgency in both governance 
and negotiating the international system.   
Though Uganda achieved 
independence from the British in 1962, the 
country has never enjoyed a significant 
period of peace.  Over the course of its 
independent history, Uganda has seen 
every ruler ousted from power by coup or 
insurgency save one in 1980 who was 
deposed via fraudulent elections in 1980.  
After those elections in 1980,  Yoweri 
Museveni, the vice chairman of the 
Military Commission and leader of the 
Figure 1  Area affected by LRA 
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Ugandan Patriotic Movement Party mobilized southern followers to begin an armed rebellion in 
protest of the outcome of the election.  The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) lead by 
Museveni took power in 1986 and Museveni was sworn in as president.  Since the colonial era, 
the Acholi and Lango tribes had dominated the military and the swearing in of the Southerner 
Museveni created panic among military forces and their respective ethnic groups.  Fearing 
reprisals, many former soldiers fled to the north and many Northern civilians fled to southern 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Capitalizing on the tensions between the Acholi 
and the government, Alice Auma ―Lakwena‖9 formed the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM)  as a 
rebel force in Northern Uganda made up primarily of Acholi religious adherents and former 
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLA) soldiers who had formed the Ugandan People’s 
Democratic Army (UPDA)  after fleeing the capital.  ―Lakwena‖ was said to communicate with 
the spirits and used her influence as a spirit medium to lead troops and build her movement .  
The HSM is the insurgent antecedent to the Lord’s Resistance Army, basing their reasons for 
rebellion on a mixture of Christian and traditional religious principles and asserting that in 
Luwero the UNLA’s Acholi elements had placed a stain on the reputation of the Acholi people 
that required purification (Finnstrom; 2006).  The HSM integrated the UPDA remnants and 
Northern residents afraid of the retribution of the NRA and religious adherents and was most 
notable for singing Christian hymns while marching into battle and their belief that they would 
be protected from enemy bullets by rubbing shea butter oil on their chests (Dolan; 2009).   
While the HSM movement did have some early victories and an expansion of their forces 
to include Lango and Iteso followers, Lakwena and her forces were defeated 50 miles outside of 
                                                 
9
 Lakwena is not a surname but a title in this context.  The Lakwena, according to her and her followers, was able to 
channel messages from the spirit world and wanted to lead a movement that would cleanse not just the Acholi 
people but also the nation as a whole.  For a more complete explanation of Alice Auma and the Holy Spirit 
Movement see Robert Gersony’s ―The Anguish of Northern Uganda‖. 
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Kampala in November of 1987.   In 1988 the NRA extended amnesty to those that had 
participated in the UPDA/HSM and 2,000 (most of those troops who sought amnesty) were 
absorbed into the NRA forces.  Those who resolved to continue fighting, because of the NRA 
treatment of Northerners or the loss of Acholi cattle to rustlers or a number of other proposed 
reasons, were absorbed into the fledgling movement of  Joseph Kony, reported cousin of Alice 
Auma, the Lord’s Resisitance Army.    The LRA was also driven by mixed religious undertones 
and was predominantly Acholi.  Like Lakwena, Kony claimed to be a spirit messenger but is 
notable for his opportunistic approach to religious doctrine in that he has sampled from local 
Animist, Christian, and Muslim traditions as they serve his needs.   
 At the outset of Kony’s war, reports indicated that the Lord’s Resistance Army enjoyed a 
measure of popular support from the Acholi community.  But in 1991 the government initiated 
―Operation North‖ which included a counter-insurgency operation and the organization of local 
defense units in Northern Uganda.  During Operation North, the government imposed a media 
black-out in Acholiland and has been implicated in numerous extra-judicial killings, looting and 
human rights violations  (Gersony, 1997).  Despite the heavy-handed tactics of the government, 
much of the Acholi population was willing to support government troops in the bow and arrow 
defense units but were severely under-equipped to deal with the rebel attacks and were largely 
massacred as they had only minimal support from government troops.  ―Operation North‖ is 
important in the war for two reasons: first, the LRA is said to have been reduced to a fraction of 
its forces by 1994 and second, a rift was created between the civilian Acholi population and the 
LRA.  
 A major question that has been asked by both international observers and the Acholi 
community is why, if the LRA’s troop numbers had been so decimated, did the government not 
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destroy the remaining elements of the rebellion.  Some suggested that the conflict provided cover 
for delivery by Uganda of military supplies to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), an 
armed anti-Sudanese government insurgency based in southern Sudan whose goals included the 
dissolution of the present Sudanese state in favor of a two state solution with Northern Sudan 
ruled by the Arabic, Muslim majority and Southern Sudan being ruled by the Christian African 
majority.  Yoweri Museveni attended the University of Dar es Salaam with John Garang, the 
head of the SPLA and openly supported the group until 2002 when Sudan and Uganda signed an 
agreement to end support for each other’s rebel forces.  Government sources assert that a lack of 
technical competence in the correct deployment of air and ground resources prevented a 
complete victory in 1991  (Gersony, 1997).  Neither explanation dispelled the rumors that 
immediately sprang up in the Acholi community - that the government wanted to punish the 
Acholi for the Acholi soldiers participation in the government attempts to squash the NRA 
insurgency in the early 1980s (Bainomugisha, 2005).  While these rumors have never been 
confirmed, they have shaped the relationship between the Acholi and the central government. 
 The second significant change that came from the 1991 unfinished operation was the 
change in tactics by the LRA with regards to the Acholi civilian population.  Because Kony 
himself is an Acholi as is the majority of the rebel force, it is widely assumed by the international 
community and civil war scholars that the LRA is an agent of the Acholi community.  In truth, 
the written political manifestos and speeches by the commanders of the LRA have almost always 
made references to the grievances of the Acholi people including the desire for reparation for lost 
cattle, closure of the camps, and the expansion of national politics to more fully include the 
Northern communities.  
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 This advocacy, however, is squarely contradicted by the conduct of the LRA.  In 1991, 
the government sought and received support from the traditional leadership in the Acholi 
community to organize Bow and Arrow defense units, which were organized as a show that the 
Acholi people were helping in the defense of their own community.  These defense units were 
largely failures as they were equipped only with traditional weapons.  In addition, they were not 
working in concert with the central government but as a substitute and so had no real 
reinforcements when the rebels came.  Regardless of their impact, Kony took the Bow and 
Arrow Units as a betrayal, and from this point in the war targeted civilians, using increasingly 
brutal tactics. Typically, disfigurement and dismemberment were used to send a message to the 
Acholi when the LRA discovered informants they considered to be working with the 
government.  This strategy has meant that the war in Northern Uganda is being fought through 
the Acholi community rather than for the Acholi.  Svenker Finnstrom (2006) discusses this in 
conjunction with the public retraction of the war blessing and subsequent cursing of the LRA by 
Acholi elders.  These claims are hard to verify but because they carry so much symbolic weight 
in the Acholi community even the rumors that the elders have rejected the LRA is a powerful 
sign to the rebel leadership.  Finnstrom, suggests that, even without verification, they are part of 
the collective memory of the Acholi and should be considered ―critical events‖ in the war.  The 
rejection and failure of the LRA to cultivate durable popular support means they should not be 
considered ―agents‖ of the Acholi people.   
Though the majority of those now fighting with the LRA are Acholi, the force is not 
exclusively Acholi and it cannot be assumed that outside the high command of the group, they 
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are even willing participants as the number of abductions attributed to the LRA are in the tens of 
thousands
10
 (Blattman, 2008).   
The relationship between the North and the Southern government has not been one of 
complete neglect but rather inefficiency and halfhearted implementation of programs, which 
serves to reinforce the impression that the government is minimally concerned with the welfare 
of those living in northern Uganda.  In 1992, the government approved the Northern Uganda 
Reconstruction Program (NURPI) that allocated 600 million dollars to restore basic economic 
and social infrastructure as well as revive economic activities in the northern region.  The 
program actually dispersed only 93 million of those resources.  The World Bank’s assessment of 
the program attributed its limited implementation to a disorganized plan of dispersal, chronic 
instability, and excessive waste in the distribution of funds chiefly associated with the top down 
nature of the program (Post-conflict Reconstruction: The Case of Northern Uganda, 2003).   
In 1993, anticipating an opportunity to reach a settlement, Betty Bigombe the Minister of 
State in the Office of the Prime Minister, Resident in Northern Uganda
11
, initiated talks with the 
LRA
12
.  Bigombe is ethnic Acholi and was seen in Northern Uganda as someone committed to 
ending the conflict and having the interests of the community in mind.  In November of 1993 
Bigombe and mid-level LRA representatives met to discuss the conflict.  The meeting went well, 
violence directed at civilians eased, and much of the Acholi community felt both sides were 
                                                 
10
 To clarify we should not see the rejection of the LRA by the Acholi as de facto support of the central government.  
As will be discussed below the Acholi take the inability or unwillingness of the UPDF to protect the Acholi 
community and the continued use of ―protected villages‖ where there are no services and minimal safety measures 
as a serious failing of the government.  This dissatisfaction is manifested by the consistant oppositional voting 
patterns of the Acholi people.  In both recent elections the governing party gained no more than 20% of the vote in 
any of the Acholiland provinces.  
11
 Bigombe was originally named the Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda, Resident in Gulu by 
Museveni but the title caused considerable controversy given the connotation of the word ―pacification‖ in this case, 
and so her title was changed to appease northern leaders. 
12
 These meetings were undertaken at first without the support of the central government and should not be seen as 
an explicit attempt to engage the LRA or the Acholi people. At no time were the top army leadership including the 
President, willing to go on record in open support of the talks and though it seemed the president supported the 
initiative, he remained withdrawn from the process. 
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willing to make concessions to end the conflict especially when considered in conjunction with 
the announcement of the NURPI plans.   
In January of 1994, Bigombe and government military officers met with Kony to discuss 
a cease-fire but the negotiations began to deteriorate in the planning for the meeting between 
President Museveni and Kony to make the final arrangements.  In private conversations Bigombe 
hinted that there were attempts at every stage to sabotage the talks from various quarters, 
including representatives of the government (Lucima, 2002). Because of the increasing tension at 
the talks, the meeting between Museveni and Kony was postponed indefinitely.   
 In February of 1994, Museveni visited Gulu and while addressing the crowd at Kaunda 
Ground, the President said that Bigombe had begun talks with the LRA to restore peace, but that 
the LRA had taken advantage of the talks to perpetuate 'banditry' and murder. He announced that 
the LRA had seven days to surrender, or the government would defeat them militarily (Lucima, 
2002).  The LRA leadership had asked for 30 days and took the statement as an abdication of the 
peace talks.  After the failure, the perception in the Acholi community was that the government 
was not actually committed to a peaceful end to the conflict and when new military leadership 
was brought into Gulu, many saw it as a sign that the government was giving up on peace.  In 
1995, just after the collapse of the talks between the government and the rebels, Yoweri 
Museveni was officially elected president of Uganda despite the previous 10 years of rule during 
which he was leader of the National Resistance Movement and leader of the country rather than 
elected official.  During the election, Kony ordered a cease fire so that Northern residents could 
vote against the Museveni regime, which they did with no province in Acholi land providing 
more that 20% support to Museveni’s bid (Stats citation).  After the re-installation of Museveni 
and the collapse of the peace talks, the LRA crossed the border into Sudan and found a willing 
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benefactor in the Khartoum government.  Chris Dolan notes that the period between 1994-9 was 
the period of most intense violence against civilians by the rebels.    
 In response to the increased activity of the LRA, the government encouraged and in many 
cases forced Northern residents to move into ―protected villages‖ beginning in 1996.  The 
villages included barracks and detachments of government troops with the troops stationed in the 
center of the camps.  This project includes an expanded discussion of the conditions in the 
―protected villages‖ and so here, I will only mention that violence in the camps is endemic and 
troops stationed within the camps will often ignore requests for protection and abuse their power 
by extorting goods and services from residents as well as physically abusing inhabitants  (Dolan, 
2009).  This continued internment of the Northern residents is particularly disturbing given that 
by 2006, fully 20 years after the start of the 
conflict, more than 90% of all people living 
in the Acholiland lived in the government 
camps  (Reuters, 2009).  The abuses here 
strengthen the impression for the Acholi that 
the continuation of the conflict is meant as 
vengeance. Further it has meant the 
decimation of their economic capacity as 
most were forced to give up farms and 
property resulting in an almost complete 
reliance on the government and international 
NGOs for food and services as over 60% of 
northerners are unemployed  (Bozzoli, 2008).  In addition, in response to the movement into the 
Figure 2 Percnt of the Population by District Living in 
"Protected Villages" 
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camps the LRA increased its activity, with an enormous number of abductions and attacks on the 
newly created camps, highlighting the distance between what the government was willing or able 
to do for the population and what was necessary to protect them.   
Acholi Civil Society and Initiatives for Peace 
 
In response to both the introduction of the protected villages and what locals called 
―panda gari13‖, which was a program that forced northern residents to be able to identify 
themselves at all times and made them subject to interrogation and incarceration if they could not 
satisfactorily prove they were not a rebel or rebel sympathizer, the Acholi diaspora began openly 
criticizing the Kampala government for not doing enough to protect their citizens. In 1997 after 
the first Kacoke Madit meeting in London during which representatives from the LRA, the 
Acholi diaspora and domestic civil society, and the government met to discuss the conflict they 
also criticized Museveni for his dogged commitment to a military solution to the war rather than 
exploring other avenues to peace.  During the period between 1997 and 1999 there was an 
increasing voice for civil society groups which put pressure on the central government to return 
to the negotiating table in 1999.  
 These meetings led to the 2000 Amnesty Act that granted amnesty to anyone who had 
since 1986 engaged in war against the government and blanket forgiveness for all persons under 
the age of 12 (Dolan; 2009).  This concession on the part of the government appeared to signal a 
willingness to pursue a non-military end to the conflict.  
                                                 
13 
13
 The term ―panda gari‖ is Kaswahili for ―climb the truck‖ and has been a recurring campaign in Ugandan 
history.  In the early 1980s under the Obote regime, soldiers would station themselves at markets and religious 
places and select young people from the crowds that they suspected to be supporting guerillas or more generally 
were anti-government.  During this time, the vast majority of those who were taken by government soldiers never 
returned.  A.B.K. Kasozi asserts that as few as 10% of those taken during ―panda gari‖ campaigns returned (Kasozi; 
1994: 148).  Under Museveni’s rule, the same tactic was used in the North.  In the early 1990s mainly women and 
children were rounded up but in the later iterations of the practice young men and boys were detained, arrested, and 
sometimes executed on suspicion of being a rebel or rebel supporter (Dolan; 2009: 47) 
  
61 
 In 2001, however, Museveni was re-elected and in 2002, the parliament passed the Anti-
terrorism Act, which effectively repealed the amnesty agreements and increased military 
spending.  Also in 2002 the governments of Sudan and Uganda undertook a joint military 
operation, ―Operation Iron-Fist,‖ during which 10,000 Ugandan troops were permitted to cross 
into Sudan in search of rebels and also crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
ostensibly for the same reasons. In turn, the LRA attacked civilian populations with a brutality 
not seen since the establishment and removal of the Acholi population into protected villages in 
1996.  
 During this same period of 2001-2002, Acholi civil society, comprised of the Rwot of 
the Acholi and the Ker Kwaro Acholi
14
 and the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative 
(ARLPI) actively petitioned the government for a peaceful settlement to the conflict and closure 
of the ―protected villages.‖  President Museveni, however, announced in New Vision, the 
government newspaper, that the camps would not close until the LRA had been destroyed and 
the UPDF twice attacked religious leadership saying they were thought to be rebel supporters  
(Ochola, 2006).  The rocky relationship between Museveni and the military and the Acholi 
leadership has perpetuated a culture of mistrust in Uganda and made it clear that the Acholi have 
very limited control over the activities of their government. 
In 2003 after undertaking ―Operation Iron Fist‖, President Museveni announced that 
Uganda would refer the rebel group to the International Criminal Court for prosecution to rebuild 
flagging international support for the regime.  This decision would later be reversed when it 
became politically less useful for the regime.  From the middle of 2004 on, rebel activity dropped 
                                                 
14
 The Ker Kwaro Acholi is a groups of traditional Acholi leaders that are working to see a negotiated settlement in 
Uganda and strengthen ties between the Ugandan Acholi and Sudanese Acholi peoples.  For a more complete 
discussion  of the Religious Leaders’ Initiative see Robert Ochola’s  The Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative 
in the Battlefield of Northern Uganda 
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markedly under intense military pressure in both Uganda and Sudan where the LRA had 
established rear bases. The government was also the target of increasingly pointed criticism from 
the international community for its failure to end the conflict.  International aid agencies 
questioned the Ugandan government's reliance on military force and its commitment to a 
peaceful resolution. So in 2006 the government and LRA returned to negotiations but the 
government admitted to maintaining military operations against the LRA during the duration of 
the two year peace talks.  Both the Acholi community within Uganda and the diaspora has 
condemned this manner of negotiation on the part of the Kampala government as disingenuous 
and Kony has refused to sign any agreements as he and the leadership fear immediate 
prosecution if they cooperate.  The inflammatory statements by President Museveni to the press 
reinforce this fear
15
.   
This history forms the basis for the relationship between the government and the Acholi 
people and though much of the blame for the continued violence is attributed to the LRA by 
media and NGOs, a consistent reluctance on the part of the government to make peace is evident 
to the residents of the Northern provinces.  In 2008, the negotiations between the rebels and the 
government again failed as the LRA was reported to be purchasing new weapons;  the heads of 
Uganda, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) agreed to launch the ―Garamba 
Offensive‖ in the Garamba Forest in the northern corner DRC to finally destroy the rebel faction.  
On the 21st of December 2008, the Ugandan government released a statement saying that 70% of 
the LRA's camps had been destroyed so far  (BBC, 2008).  Directly following the release of that 
                                                 
15
 To the New Vision paper in Uganda Museveni said ―If Kony does not take chance of the peace talks, he will 
perish like the [biblical] pharaoh," in 2007 during the Juba peace talks and more recently, "If our troops get a chance 
of capturing Kony, he will be tried here and be hanged. We will not take him to ICC court in Hague court because 
there they take such people in hotels. Here, we will hang him" on March 10
th
 of this year.  (Magga, 2010) 
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statement, however, the LRA was implicated in the massacre of 400 people in the DRC on 
Christmas Day.   
Since then, reports of the LRA in the DRC, Sudan, Uganda, and the Central African 
Republic have surfaced, although few can be confirmed.  What can be confirmed is that despite 
international commitment to eliminating the LRA, the combined power of Uganda, Sudan and 
the DRC has failed to remove the threat for 24 years of fighting.  In Michael Wilkerson’s article 
(2010) questioning why the LRA can’t be stopped, he concludes that, ―put simply, the LRA's 
fortuitous combination of murky international alliances, child soldiers, and bumbling enemies 
has proved stronger than any military offensive over the last 20 years.‖  I contend, however, that 
given the resources that have been made available to the Ugandan government, the continuation 
of the conflict in Northern Uganda continues, not because insufficient resources are available or 
that the LRA has amazing luck, but that the combination of international assistance and the low 
level conflict conditions the relationships between the state and civilian population and the state 
and the military.  The addition of these two factors secures the administration in the midst of 
insecurity in the country and makes the termination of conflict unlikely until the costs of war 
outweigh the benefits of political cover internationally and domestically with limited political 
challenge to the sitting administration.  The following sections apply the theory presented above 
to the case of Uganda.   
Civil State Relationship: 
 
The relationship between the government and the people in Uganda is often defined as 
merely as a function of ethnic tensions created during the colonial period and continued by the 
post-colonial leadership.  While this tension is salient in Ugandan politics, elites use ethnicity as 
a tool that can clearly define their primary constituencies and condition the voting public 
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expectations of the voting public from individual politicians and more recently political parties.  
Ethnicity in and of itself is not the source of conflict but merely the identity used by elites to 
mobilize parts of the population.  In this sense, what the division is doesn’t matter but that there 
is a division that has been deftly used to condition the electorate’s understanding how to garner 
access to the state and its resources.   Structuring political competition on the basis of ethnic 
affiliation, however, is not an accepted method of governing by international aid agencies such 
as World Bank, the IMF and OECD countries upon which Uganda relies heavily with 48% of its 
GDP coming from international assistance (Taylor and Francis Group, 2004).  While World 
Bank is officially apolitical, they monitor six dimensions of governance and corruption as a way 
of measuring a state’s development which is used by other countries when considering bilateral 
aid and organizations like the Bush Administration’s Millennium Challenge Account which does 
not lend to countries unless they have met the World Bank standards of good governance.   
A political constituency that has direct lines of accountability to individual politicians and 
expects resources to be provided in exchange for their continued support and international 
donors who see this neo-patrimonial political model as institutionalized corruption and can 
withhold assistance based on the perceived corruption of the state (or funnel funds into non-state 
intermediaries as they did during the  late 1970s and early 1980s
16
 after economists began to 
question the efficacy of state led development strategies) create two important constraints.  
Rulers need some method of providing for their primary constituencies without losing the 
financial backing of the international aid community.   
                                                 
16
 This development strategy was outlined in E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful (1989) that argued against the 
desirability of industrialization and extolled the merits of handicrafts economies.  Put briefly, the emphasis for 
development should not be on government initiatives but individual and local efforts to develop.  What this 
movement accomplished was the removal of the state from playing its previously substantial role in economic 
development and encouraged a bottom up view on development.   
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In Uganda leaders have solved this problem by allowing the low level insurgency of the 
LRA to continue in the North as the insurgency divides the constituency into those affected by 
the civil war and those who are not.  This division roughly mimics the existing ethno-geographic 
division of the country, effectively masking the existing political constituencies by dividing the 
country into places where service provision is feasible and places where it is not rather than 
North and South or Buganda and Banyankole and Acholi.  
 In all countries where there are active wars different segments of the population bear 
varying burdens.  But in the cases where the people who are most affected by the conflict do not 
provide political resources to the leadership of the country, rulers will not invest the resources 
necessary to end the conflict as the investment does not provide sound return.  This is the 
mechanism by which civil wars are extended temporally.  I. William Zartman introduces the 
concept of a ―mutually hurting stalemate‖ which requires a depletion of available resources, the 
costs for continued conflict to be too high and/or a reduction in in-group support (2001).  
 In Uganda, if we consider the LRA as the sole culprit for the duration of civil war, the 
picture is baffling as there is almost no support for the war among the Acholi, resources are 
scarce, and the population is no longer willing to join the group.  But if we accept that the state 
plays a part in the duration and termination of conflict, we see that resources are not scarce, and 
in fact the country receives military assistance to subsidize its ―war effort.‖  The primary 
constituency of the sitting administration is outside the conflict area, and the benefits of low level 
conflict are greater than the disadvantages and do not threaten the continued functioning of the 
economic and political seats of power within the country.   
 The second problem faced by elected officials that is mitigated by the ongoing conflict in 
the North is the threat of a strong political opposition.  While in a functional democratic system 
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political competition is an expected outcome, where politicians can restrict that competition 
without fear of consequence we can expect them to do so.   By allowing the war to continue, 
political opposition is limited in two ways: the marginalization of opposition parties and 
politicians as rebel supporters and the limitation of the ability of the affected communities from 
participating in politics with the continued use of IDP camps and military presence in the North.  
In Uganda, the Acholi, and more broadly the northern ethnic groups have been politically 
marooned with no access to the government or reasonable expectation of service provision, a 
situation which, in theory, should encourage political mobilization to demand basic services of 
the state. Even when resources were allocated for the North, such as 1992 Northern Uganda 
Reconstruction Program I which allocated 660 million dollars to development programs in the 
North, only 93 million was ever distributed to the programs for which it was intended.  The rest 
disappeared into other programs or was converted into the personal resources of those charged 
with the execution of the program.  
 This clear example of corruption in a democratic system should be an incident that 
prompts the political reaction of the affected community but because the Acholi are so far 
removed from the political process, the reaction was limited.  In 2005 Uganda officially lifted the 
ban on multi-party politics which should have provided space for opposition parties to organize 
and compete on equal footing with the National Resistance Movement, but opposition candidates 
and even civil society groups seeking the end of the conflict in the North have experienced 
consistent pressure from both the military and the state under the aegis of national security and 
counter terrorism efforts.  By limiting the ability of those people marginalized in the current 
system to organize politically, sitting politicians limit effective political challenge without openly 
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restricting political participation.  These two problems have been solved by the low level conflict 
while allowing politicians to maintain the international aid flow into Uganda. 
 The two key assumptions about democratic governance are challenged when the state is 
not constructed to be a representative of all people.  That history will establish a pattern of 
marginalization and demonstrate for politicians that there are effective ways of making 
traditionally collective goods into selective rewards for those faithful to their own administration 
and limiting the ability of those outside the circles of patronage to punish politicians for not 
providing equal benefits by limiting their access to the political system.  Historically, the British 
deemed the Acholi
17
 the tribal group best suited for military service and so they constructed an 
Acholi dominated colonial military and because the Buganda people in the South represented the 
largest and most politically cohesive of the kingdoms the British saw them as the most suited for 
governance positions.  In addition, the area identified as Acholiland, which comprises most of 
the territory above the White Nile, contains only four percent of the country’s arable land so the 
British saw the south as a stronger economic investment.  This resulted in the vast majority of 
colonial investments being concentrated in the South with the North used as a labor reserve for 
Southern farms and industries and the military.  Effectively this created a base of power for both 
regions, the Acholi represented in the military and the Southern tribes (dominated by the 
Buganda) represented in the economic and governance structures.   
After independence, however, the military has been seen as a key political asset and with 
every regime change, the armed forces have been purged and restructured with representatives 
from the ethnic group of the regime leadership rather than ever forming a representative and 
                                                 
17
 In southern Uganda the word ―Acholi‖ is loosely used to refer to all of the Nilotic, Sudanic, and 
Hamitic peoples of northern Uganda rather than specifically the Acholi ethnic group.  Also people from the 
Northern districts of Uganda have been called ―Anyanya‖ a pejorative that suggests that the Northern population is 
not Ugandan but Sudanese. (Fredrick; 2009) 
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independent body.  This purge and stock strategy should not be interpreted as the manifestation 
of primordial hatreds but as a symptom of Hyden’s ―economy of affection.‖  As discussed above, 
the Ugandan state, like other colonial possessions was not constructed as a national project 
between elites and the population but imposed by the British colonizers.  The governing structure 
installed was one of indirect rule whose purpose was to maximize the outputs for British people 
and industries at minimum cost.  This meant suppressing rebellion and limiting state expenditure 
were the key priorities of the administration.   
After the British left, the post-colonial leadership did not change the way the government 
was constructed and the state is seen as a source of resources for a politician’s direct 
constituency rather than a representative of a broader Ugandan population.  That this method of 
political service clearly is how politics is understood in Uganda today becomes evident when 
examining the levels of social service provision and economic development in each half of the 
country.   
Traditional indicators such as unemployment and health and social service provision 
provide a stark picture of the difference in development between the North and South.  This 
project does focus on the duration of conflict in Uganda but the pattern of service provision and 
involvement of the central government in the North should be seen as a model of how they will 
view security as well.  The Department for International Development’s (DFID) Cindy Carlson 
noted, while reviewing health service provision in Northern Uganda, that ―the government would 
appear to have ambivalent will and uncertain capacity to resolve the conflict in the north and to 
devote national resources to services in northern districts.‖  (Carlson, 2004)   In 2006 the 
Ugandan Bureau of Statistics conducted a Demographic and Health Survey in the country and 
found that child mortality rate for children under 5 in Kampala was just over half of the mortality 
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rate in the north, 94 and 177 per 100,000 children respectively.  Similarly, unemployment rates 
reflect this pattern of government investment and overall development.  In 1993, poverty rates 
were 73.5% Northern Uganda and 56.4% for the overall country. By 2006, national poverty 
estimates dropped to 27.1%, but in Northern Uganda they remained at 66%.  (Bozzoli, 2008) 
When looking at the above statistics, it would be a mistake to assume that the government 
of Uganda was actively persecuting those who live in the North as an overt project or campaign 
to destroy the Acholi.  Some have suggested that the conflict in the North should be considered a 
genocide in which the government is complicit but the difficulty is proving the intention to 
destroy the Acholi given the likelihood that international assistance would end and disrupt the 
already wobbly power structure that exists in Uganda  (Otunnu, 2006).  Genocide is not rational 
when the continued power of sitting politicians is so dependent on foreign assistance in funding 
social programs and military spending.  The argument being presented here is that the duration of 
the war in the north is the logical outcome of the manner by which the state was constructed and 
the attempt by politicians to minimize the resources necessary to maintain political power by 
only representing those people who pose a threat to political tenure.  The decision to fight by the 
LRA changed the incentive structure that existed in Uganda and by isolating, targeting, and 
drawing from only one ethnic group, they effectively relieved the state of the responsibility to 
protect and provide for that sector of the population as now the resources required to end the 
conflict are greater than those required to contain it.  The rewards here are votes and resources 
for the state.  In Uganda, the vast majority of the economic enterprise is located in the South as is 
the stronghold of government support.  If the supporters of the government should begin to bear 
the cost of continued conflict, the government would have the incentive to intercede more 
effectively to end the conflict as they have done with other rebellions.   
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Since 1986 when the NRA took power there have been over 20 armed rebellions in 
Uganda which have either been coopted into the LRA or the y were more geographically 
proximate to the government and were therefore addressed quickly.  With each one the 
government has courted and subsequently absorbed the soldiers into the national army.  There 
have been some attempts by the government to do the same with the LRA but movements like 
the Amnesty Act of 2000 are seen as disingenuous by the broader civilian population because of 
the state’s persistent refusal to commit to a non-military solution and the rebels have seen as a 
trap as there are reports of surrendering LRA soldiers being shot as active rebel combatants or 
being forced to join the state military
18
.   
Examples of overt repression of opposition candidates exist. The government has 
attempted to tie the ongoing insurgency to emergent political leadership even though virtually all 
of the leadership from the North has flatly rejected the LRA and has called for the peaceful end 
to the conflict.  In 2005, after a referendum, the ban on multi-party politics was lifted to allow 
opposition parties in Uganda after pressure from international donors with concerns of the 
legitimacy of the ―democractic‖ government in Uganda. 
 In 2001 Dr. Kizza Besigye, a former supporter of the NRM and friend of Museveni,  ran 
under the movement system to challenge Museveni but was defeated and subsequently 
threatened into exile until 2005 when party politics were instituted in Uganda.  Upon his return 
Besigye was court martialed for collaborating with the terrorists (LRA) and treason.  He was 
arrested when he arrived in Uganda and was released from prison only one month before the 
election after the case against him was dismissed as the court ruled that the High Court could not 
hear court martial changes (BBC, 2006). His prosecution was especially puzzling given his 
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 There has been recent outcry over this tactic because the Ugandan military has been indicted in the use of children 
and mistreating those who are willingly surrendering.   
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history as an NRM loyalist, colonel in the army and personal physician to Museveni.  It was only 
when he became critical of the regime did the allegations arise.   
 Further Olara Otunnu, a leading oppositional voice in Uganda has been prevented from 
returning to Uganda for the upcoming presidential election because of charges of sedition and 
promoting sectarianism after suggesting that President had been involved in prolonging the civil 
war in the North  (Lawrence, 2009).  These examples are typical in semi-democratic countries 
where political competition is not institutionalized but in Uganda, the persecution of the 
opposition is tolerated because of the ongoing threat in the North.  The marginalization of the 
North is not restricted to only potential political challengers but also to the people of the north.  
The ―protected villages‖ are a source of conflict between the central government and leaders, 
political and religious in the north.  There are socio-economic costs of the camps paid by the 
residents as well as political costs.  The feeling in the broader Acholi community is that they are 
being punished for not supporting Museveni and the NRM.  Otunnu, also a former  U.N. under 
secretary-general and special representative for children and armed conflict and presidential 
candidate from Gulu district in the North has suggested that by not ending the conflict the 
government has not only abdicated its role as a protector of Ugandan citizens but is actively 
allowing for the destruction of the Acholi and Lango people.   
While that is not the argument being made here, the camps do serve a purpose for the 
government.  Constructed under the auspices of providing protection for the northern population 
and to separate the possibly sympathetic recruits from the LRA, the camps have been used as a 
way of controlling the movement and activities of the Acholi.  During the 1996 ―panda gari‖ 
campaign, numerous reports of government soldiers harassing political opponents of Museveni 
and targeting political rallies effectively prevented solid political mobilization from within the 
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Acholi community (Dolan; 2009).  Dislocation makes voting a difficult process at election time 
and the presence of state troops in the camps to regulate and monitor the activities of camp 
residents makes political mobilization almost impossible.   
Willet Weeks, working for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, attributes the lack of motivation by the government as a symptom of the 
lack of political utility the Acholi as voters have for the government saying,  ―the fact that the 
three districts have consistently voted for the political opponents of the present government…has 
cemented the latter’s view that Acholiland is inhospitable territory.‖  (Weeks, 2002)  Even if the 
government is not acting with intent to marginalize the Acholi people, the understanding in the 
camps and the community more broadly is that this is the intention.  By sending this message to 
the community, the government effectively pushes them out of the political sphere and, given the 
constant military presence in the camps and the environment of fear and resentment among the 
Acholi, prevents any real mobilization  
State Military Relations 
 
The second factor that strongly determines the length of civil war in Uganda is the nature 
of civil-military relations.  In every historical era, hard-pressed rulers have used theft from 
neighbors or helped followers to amass personal fortunes at the expense of the broader 
population as a key component of domestic political bargaining.  This is especially true in states 
where the military retains a significant portion of its independence. Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler (2006), in their study of military spending and coup attempts, concluded that in states 
where the perceived risk of coup d’état is high, leaders will increase military spending to appease 
the military.  Coup risk is inevitably high in states like Uganda where the military has not only 
retained political independence but has historically been the guardians of political power in the 
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country.  This section will outline the history of state military relations and show why leaders 
believe that appeasement of the military is necessary and how the conflict in the North is used as 
part of a strategy of appeasement. 
Since independence in 1962, seven political regimes have ruled in Uganda.  Of those  
seven every leader excluding the sitting president has been removed by military intervention, be 
it by coup d’etat  (Milton Obote I, Yusuf Lule, and Godfrey Binaisa), internal revolution (Milton 
Obote II and Tito Lutwa Okello) or externally funded war (Idi Amin). Additionally, during this 
period there were two failed attempts on Obote’s life that were said to have originated out of the 
military.   These regime changes have conditioned political elites, especially President Museveni, 
who was involved in the removal of three of the other six political leaders, to understand the 
military as a key source of political power and, like leaders historically, has tried to decrease the 
likelihood of internal revolt by providing goods, resources and the freedom to amass wealth by 
using their positions in the military.   
The most famous example of keeping troops happy and  loyal and assert himself as the 
guardian of the bounty of the state was the so-called "whiskey run" almost weekly to Stansted 
Airport in Britain, when plane loads of King of Scots blend scotch, radios, and luxury goods 
were purchased by President Idi Amin to distribute among his officers and troops (Byrnes, 
1990).  An African proverb sums up the understanding of the military by Amin and other leaders 
as "A dog with a bone in its mouth can't bite."    
To provide this largesse to the military, leaders must have access to resources from either 
tax accumulation, natural resources, or international aid that is part of their discretionary 
spending budget. The old-style personal dictatorships that ruled Africa with impunity are 
virtually nonexistent today as are rulers like the Central African Republic's Jean-Bedel Bokassa, 
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or Equatorial Guinea's Macias Nguemamen, who eliminated potential dissent with such brutality 
and openly allowed the military to extract resources both from the state and local populations.  
These dictatorial regimes have almost all been replaced with semi-democratic regimes that are 
heavily dependent on international assistance externally and therefore restricted by international 
conditions domestically and are required to either meaningfully reduce military predation by 
restricting the power of the military or by finding ways to engage the military in ways that 
appear legitimate internationally.   
Museveni, after taking control of the capital, appointed his closest allies to top positions 
in government, purged without compensation the existing soldiers and officers who were 
primarily Acholi and opposed his takeover of government, and forced their retreat to the Holy 
Spirit Movement and later the LRA.  Appointing those who had fought with him during the civil 
war to these newly vacated positions prevented unrest among his troops, thereby limiting the 
likelihood of an officer coup and establishing a representative of the regime within the military.  
Museveni eventually filled many of the top military and intelligence positions in government 
with his own family including the appointment in 1996 of his brother, General Salim Saleh, to 
lead the government initiative in the North and Saleh later served as the commander of the 
army's Reserve Force from 1990 -2001. (Family Rule in Uganda, 2009) 
 Also to maintain stability and prevent coup attempts from within the military, Museveni 
has given his troops a wide range of territory and implemented little regulation on civilian-
soldier interaction or secondary incomes for soldiers. This territory includes Uganda, north of the 
White Nile, where the Acholi dominated areas of the country are and  Eastern DRC, and 
Southern Sudan where reports of the LRA have provided access for Ugandan troops and the 
natural resources have provided the desire for troop commanders to ―police‖ their neighbors.  
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Because the boarders between these countries are so porous there is limited complaint from 
border states until Ugandan troops challenge the authority of domestic militaries in auto-
predation. This has led to the appropriation of resources by all levels of the military to subsidize 
their limited and sporadic salaries. Ugandan soldiers have crossed both the Northern and Western 
borders into Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and have been documented bringing 
Congelese natural resources across the border into Uganda.  Ugandan soldiers also have been 
charged with  extracting resources from residents of the "protected villages" in Northern Uganda 
and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has called for the removal of all Ugandan troops 
from Sudan as they have been implicated in the destruction of villages and murder of Sudanese 
civilians  (Dak, 2008) 
The resource extraction and lack of discipline of Ugandan troops is so widely reported 
that both Sudan and the DRC, neither of which are known for disciplined armed forces have 
requested that Ugandan troops be pulled out of their territories.  The DRC, in fact, brought suit in 
the International Court of Justice against Uganda for human rights violations and the looting of 
resources such as gold, diamonds and copper from Eastern DRC in 2005 (Branch, 2007).  This 
case, while useful in establishing the activities of Ugandan troops, is an unusual check on the 
army’s activities.  Incumbent rulers often recognize that predation solves short-term problems of 
political control by keeping soldiers occupied; in the case of Uganda, the central government has 
essentially institutionalized the conflict as a part of the Ugandan politics. 
  The conflict in the North allows the Museveni government to fund the military and 
provide political cover for the indiscipline of Ugandan troops.  Uganda’s military spending has 
remained over the cap of 1.9% set by the World Bank and IMF’s since the loans were provided 
in 1997 under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.  Currently, spending is 2.2% of the 
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GDP but has been as high as 3% of GDP.  By providing more resources for military leadership, 
Museveni has built a circle of patronage that deters both the highest echelons of military 
leadership, who are not already family, from seeking a change in leadership and also wide 
enough to prevent sub-altern or junior officer coup attempts.    To prevent the incidence of 
coups, the clientalistic circles must remain wide enough to include those that are likely to usurp 
hierarchies of power.  To do this Museveni has provided state resources and allowed for UPDF 
fighters to cross into neighboring countries to engage in extra-state predation of resources to 
make up for the unreliable and limited salaries of the troops.  Both Branch and Reno suggest that 
these weaken the incentive for the military to seek negotiated settlements because they are more 
interested in prolonging the situation that allows for personal wealth accumulation (Branch; 
2005, Reno; 2004).  Traditionally, the armed forces are separated conceptually from society but 
this example demonstrates the lessons learned by citizens in African states dominated by a 
government structure disconnected from its citizens.  Elites use the power of the state to amass 
wealth at the expense of the general population and, in the case of Uganda, military service 
opens avenues of resource accumulation.   Those who are outside of the circles of influence have 
few options other than to rebel or to suffer in silence because the administration, by pocketing 
the military ensures that the military will not target the administration for removal and will also 
help to prevent the rebellion of groups within society.  After retirement, officers utilize the 
contacts and power from their military service to build retirement packages that allow them 
continued access to state resources.   
Matthew Green (2008) in his investigation of the LRA notes the persistence of retired 
generals as shop, hotel, and bar owners in the North of Uganda.  Where the local population is 
almost completely sequestered into camps, ex-military dominate the economic arena in the north.  
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Reno terms this method of threat pacification ―warlord politics‖ in which vulnerable leaders 
expand client networks to include those actors that are most likely to threaten their grasp on 
political power, effectively ensuring limited threats to political change.  Reno’s ―warlord 
politics‖ are no better identified then by Museveni’s tactic of incorporating rebel groups into the 
standing military to prevent overt threats to the political system. 
Weak state control over military predation, coupled with a tenuous link between citizen 
and state, primes the system for the marginalization of certain areas and groups as collateral 
damage and becomes integrated into the strategy of rule.  International aid structures and donor 
interest is the fuel that feeds the system of pillage and looting of the northern population and 
explains why a country with such limited ―lootable‖ resources maintains the interest in conflict. 
Not only are groups fighting for access to humanitarian and development aid, but also for the 
right to move across borders.  Because border protection, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, is 
extremely weak, armies and militias take advantage of porous boundaries to loot resources from 
neighboring countries and bring the actual products back across to countries where it is easier to 
sell and ship their product.  The international community seems to overlook this type of behavior 
and the DRC cannot protect its resources because it is essentially a failed state.  To the question 
―why continue to fight over nothing?‖  the answer is:  access to aid and the ability to plunder not 
just one country but all of the surrounding ones without international outcry. 
  While this solution has worked for the Ugandan administration in the task of pacifying 
the military, the delicate balance between domestic and international constraints cannot be 
overstated.  Uganda is widely lauded as a ―as the model country in the reconfiguration of power 
in late twentieth-century Africa" because it has "enthusiastically adopted structural adjustment 
reforms, benefited from large inflows of development aid, introduced partial political 
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liberalization, given early emphasis to human rights and popular participation at the local level, 
used military force to enhance state cohesion and stability without overt repression." (Tripp, 
2004)  President Bill Clinton on his 1998 tour of African nations identified Yoweri Museveni as 
a ―new breed‖ of African leadership because of Museveni’s stated commitment to democracy 
and economic reform (Olaka-Onyango, 2004). 
   Because of such international perception of Uganda, it was the first country to enter the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and in 2000 reached the completion point, overall 
receiving approximately two billion dollars in debt relief.  Uganda is not one of the forgotten 
developing countries but rather it has had extensive international involvement in constructing the 
post-independence nation.  This involvement, while positive in terms of macro-economic 
indicators has done little to foster peace.  Uganda’s geographic position and the desire on the part 
of the donor community to declare Uganda a success story have reduced the scrutiny with which 
the international aid organizations look at Uganda’s political progress. In effect, they are actually 
perpetuating the conflict by providing extensive aid that is used as a state resource and by 
refusing to use leverage to guarantee the cooperation of the parties at the negotiating table.   
  In order to maintain the financial support of the international community these two 
pictures of Uganda must be reconciled.  To do this the regime is using the war in the North of the 
country as a mask for activities pursued by the military that violate international laws and norms 
such as the deployment of troops across state borders and the violation of human rights  laws 
during exercises.  Further, accusations of targeting the political opposition have been leveled 
against the military, especially in the north, but the incidents have been rejected by the 
administration as moments of indiscipline by rogue soldiers rather than direct orders from the 
government.  Here I do not mean to imply that the government is directly using the military to 
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harass nascent opposition but that the abuse by the military can continue because the military 
plays such an active part in Ugandan life.  The government has gone on record numerous times 
to publically censure the military but these public acts are taken domestically as disingenuous as 
they are not followed by actual redress of grievances.  Most notably President Museveni 
removed Salim Saleh from his position in the North after accusations of looting and indiscipline 
but rather than take real punitive action against him,  Saleh was appointed as the senior 
presidential advisor on defense and security  (Family Rule in Uganda, 2009).  Actions like the 
one above communicate to the domestic population, particularly those who are most often 
targeted by the military, that indiscipline by military officers is quietly tolerated.  Further, 
whether ordered or not, the sitting regime derives direct benefits from the relative indiscipline of 
the military as it carries with it the implicit threat of violence for organizing against the state.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This project has presented evidence to suggest that in Uganda the motives and 
preferences of the state have extended the duration of civil conflict beyond the limits of what we 
would expect given the state capacity, economic development of the state and commitment 
issues that exist in the country.  Importantly, I dismiss the motivations and preferences of the  
Lord’s Resistance Army as the principle reason for the extension of conflict and suggest that the 
conflict length is in fact a consequence of the decision made by the government actors rather 
than an inexplicable anomaly in civil war literature.  In the past, LRA troops who surrendered 
under the 2001 Amnesty Act were forced into the army under threat of being charged as traitors, 
the penalty for which is death in Uganda.  The uncertainty of the rebel forces in Uganda though 
can also be seen as a function of the government’s public treatment of the subject of the peace 
agreement rather than an independent variable as public statements and speeches by the 
administration are signals to the rebel forces regarding the state’s commitment to peace.    
Accordingly the preceding theory makes two important contributions for the study of civil war 
more broadly.  First I argue that civil war duration should be understood as a function of the 
calculations made both by rebel units and the established state which has implications for the 
way in which we think of the preferences of the state.  Additionally the theoretical expectations 
suggest new variables that can be used in large N studies of duration. 
The above theory challenges our conception of the fundamental role and preferences of 
the state.  Common wisdom dictates that the state will provide for the common defense in the 
interest of self preservation.  Because we generally understand instability anywhere in the 
country as a threat to the state, the assumption is then that the state will mobilize its resources in 
order to eliminate the threat.  In the case of low level peripheral conflict in cases where the 
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international community the resources necessary for the state to survive the case of Uganda 
suggests that the preferences of the state departs from these assumptions.  Where we would 
expect to see security and stability as the primary and enduring goal, the incentives that would be 
created in the event of domestic conflict are missing.   
Essentially the conclusion of the preceding work is that political actors will make the 
decisions that have the most perceived political utility rather than serve the role as ―platonic 
guardian‖ of their citizens. If the conflict does not affect the regions that provide revenues: 
industrialized areas, sites of natural resource extraction, or agricultural areas or those regions in 
which the principle constituency of the political elites: ethnic, religious geographic, or linguistic 
groups then the state is not forced to marshal the considerable resources necessary for bring 
conflict to an end.  Additionally if political elites see other benefits to extending conflict such as 
the engagement of a semi-autonomous military, political cover for international goals, the 
manipulation of international actors  or the political  marginalization of opposition groups there 
exist disincentives to ending conflict as long as those conditions persist.   
This conclusion is key to the future study of civil war and the relationship between the 
state and its constituency because it challenges the utility of examining the state as an unitary 
organism and instead forces us to acknowledge the state not as a single organism but instead an 
ecosystem in which individual actors make self interested and political decisions sometimes at 
the expense of parts of the population.  This conclusion is not a new one in the broader study of 
state decision making and preference ordering, Robert Bates in 1987 concluded that political 
rather than economic concerns drove crop pricing policies for instance.  But the state has been 
generally undertheorized by scholars of civil war largely I would speculate because the overall 
security of a country is traditionally viewed as crucial to regime survival.   
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Second this study has generated testable hypotheses that could be used for broader 
comparison in large N quantitative comparison.  By concluding that we are looking at only half 
the picture with existing civil war literature we can hypothesize new variables that can be added 
to existing models of duration which have, according to Collier and Hoeffler performed 
―remarkably badly‖ in predicting the conclusion of conflict (2001).  New variable suggested by 
this project include: a measure of elite- population ethno-linguistic homogeneity, government 
dependence on population resource extraction (of the affected population), ethnic diversity 
within the military, and degree of autonomy in the military.   With regards to a country’s civil 
state relationship the addition of a variable that identifies whether the affected population shares 
the same socio-linguistic characteristics as the ruling elites.  In Uganda the salient characteristics 
of social groups are geographic and ethnic but other possible markers include but are not limited 
to language or religion as well.  This indicator should measure the linkages between the affected 
population and the representatives that are at least theoretically representing their interests.  
Another variable suggested by the above discussion is the historical resource extraction from the 
affected population.  If prior resource extraction was high we can expect the state would be more 
inclined to end the conflict whereas in areas where prior capital flow was minimal we can expect 
the state to be less willing to provide the resources for the public defense.  
With regards to the military state relationship there are also a number of new variables 
that can be derived from the above discussion.  Primarily the above discussion proposes that a 
semi-autonomous or completely autonomous military could contribute to the duration of civil 
war.  Military autonomy is a challenge to civilian control of government and civilian leaders may 
see an ongoing conflict in the country as a way of ensuring the allegiance of the military to the 
state as a way of preventing enterprising officers from capitalizing on the boredom and 
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discontent of peace time among junior officers and staging a coup.  Further, the character of the 
military can be useful in understanding duration of civil war.  If the military is a representative 
institution in national politics then the expansion or reduction of the armed forces more likely to 
be a policy decision based on the needs of state but if the military is dominated by a certain 
ethnic or linguistic group the military is a vehicle of patronage politics and the change in 
absolute size and composition is difficult.  When faced with international conditions placed on 
military spending politicians must either make difficult cuts to military spending or find political 
cover for maintaining the defense services.  These variables shift the focus of quantitative 
models from the calculations of rebel leadership to a combination of the preferences of rebels 
and the preferences and calculations of the state which should expand our understanding of both 
duration and state decision making.  Generally speaking these two aspects of this project while 
illustrated in the context of the Ugandan civil war above are generalizable to any country 
experiencing civil war. 
To conclude, while more cases are necessary to test this theory of state decision making I 
suggest that state preferences are variable and emerge from the dynamic context and needs of 
individuals within the state rather than from fixed responsibilities of the state.  They not only 
change across countries but also across time as the shifting political environment of war changes 
the incentives and rewards for action or inaction as the case may be.  Since little research on the 
state’s calculations during war has been included in civil war research the space for further 
research is considerable.  Also suggested by this research is an examination of the role of the 
international donor community in the protraction of civil war.  Emergency and military aid have 
been the ubiquitous offerings of charity from the international community to the people of states 
in conflict but this study suggests that in situations of peripheral conflicts, international aid may 
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have the opposite effect on conflict and may in fact be prolonging the suffering of affected 
communities by disincentivizing the termination of conflict.  Because of the severity of the 
implications of that hypothesis, more work is crucial not only to our more general understanding 
of war but to future policies regarding war torn countries.   Finally, analysis of what factors most 
significantly affect the hierarchy of state preferences is a clear field of study.  An assessment of 
the affect of military autonomy on civil war duration are clearly indicated by this study. This 
should open the field for more robust  conceptions of variables and a greater understanding of the 
relationship between the state and its principle constituencies.   
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APPENDIX  
NAME YEAR ASSUMED OFFICE COUNTRY 
Muammar al-Gaddafi 1969 
 
Libya 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema 
Mbasogo 
1979 
 
Equitorial Guinea 
Blaise Compaore 1987 
 
Burkina Faso 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali* 1987 
 
Tunisia 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-
Bashir 
1989 
 
Sudan 
Yahya Jammeh 1994 
 
The Gambia 
François Bozizé 
Yangouvonda 
2003 
 
Central African Republic 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz 2005 
 
Mauritania 
Andry Rajoelina 2009 
 
Madagascar 
Salou Djibo 2010 
 
Niger 
 
 
